Posted by: Petros Absalon C. Bojo on 22 July 2018
FACTS:
Petitioner Eduardo Pinga was named as one of two defendants in a complaint for injunction filed by respondent Heirs of German Santiago, represented by Fernando Santiago. The Complaint alleged that petitioner and co-defendant Vicente Saavedra had been unlawfully entering the coco lands of the respondent, cutting wood and bamboos and harvesting the fruits of the coconut trees.
Petitioner and his co-defendant disputed respondents' ownership of the properties in question, asserting that petitioner's father, Edmundo Pinga, from whom defendants derived their interest in the properties, had been in possession thereof since the 1930s. They alleged that as far back as 1968, respondents had already been ordered ejected from the properties after a complaint for forcible entry was filed by the heirs of Edmundo Pinga.
Respondents, as plaintiffs, had failed to present their evidence and failed to prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of time. On that ground, the complaint was dismissed. At the same time, the RTC allowed defendants "to present their evidence ex-parte."
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration and prayed that the entire action be dismissed and petitioner be disallowed from presenting evidence ex-parte. Respondents claimed that the order of the RTC allowing petitioner to present evidence ex-parte was not in accord with established jurisprudence. They cited cases, particularly City of Manila v. Ruymann and Domingo v. Santos, which noted those instances in which a counterclaim could not remain pending for independent adjudication.
ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of the complaint necessarily carries the dismissal of the compulsory counterclaim.
HELD:
The constitutional faculty of the Court to promulgate rules of practice and procedure necessarily carries the power to overturn judicial precedents on points of remedial law through the amendment of the Rules of Court. One of the notable changes introduced in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is the explicit proviso that if a complaint is dismissed due to fault of the plaintiff, such dismissal is "without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action." The innovation was instituted in spite of previous jurisprudence holding that the fact of the dismissal of the complaint was sufficient to justify the dismissal as well of the compulsory counterclaim.
In granting this petition, the Court recognizes that the former jurisprudential rule can no longer stand in light of Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
We hold that under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the complaint due to the fault of plaintiff does not necessarily carry with it the dismissal of the counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of defendants to prosecute the counterclaim.
The doctrine that the complaint may not be dismissed if the counterclaim cannot be independently adjudicated is not available to, and was not intended for the benefit of, a plaintiff who prevents or delays the prosecution of his own complaint.
