Posted by: Petros Absalon C. Bojo on 22 July 2018
FACTS:
This case at bar arose out of an earlier case with the same G. R. No. promulgated on October 12, 1998. This particular case involves the resolution of issues raised by Public Respondents in their Urgent Motion for Reconsideration against the TRO issued and the Supplemental Motion to the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration that was the meat of the October 1998 ruling.
The Facts of the case of both cases are as follows:
The Supreme Court had earlier affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray for raping the minor daughter of his common-law-wife and the corresponding penalty of death for the said crime.
Petitioner subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising mainly factual issues and the constitutionality of R. A. 7659 (the death penalty law) and the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape. The Motion was denied, the Court ruling that the death penalty was not unconstitutional.
Pending petitioner's execution, Congress changed the mode of execution from electrocution to lethal injection by passing R. A. 8177.
Petitioner then filed a petition (which was resolved in the October 1998 ruling) for Prohibition, Injunction and or a Temporary Restraining Order, enjoining the Respondents from carrying out the execution by lethal injection. Contending that it is unconstitutional and void for being cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment per set as well as by reason of its being arbitrary, unreasonable and a violation of due process, among others.
The Court granted the request for a Temporary Restraining Order and directed the Respondents to give their Comment on the case.
Respondents filed an urgent motion for Reconsideration against the said TRO and the Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Petitioner. They submit, among others, that the Court already lost jurisdiction since the Decision in the case at Bar has already become final and executor, thus its execution has entered the exclusive ambit of authority of the Executive Authority. And, that, the issuance of the TRO may be construed as trenching on that sphere of Executive Authority.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the Court has lost Jurisdiction over the case upon the Decision becoming final and executory.
HELD:
We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents that this Court lost its jurisdiction over the case at bar and hence can no longer restrain the execution of the petitioner. Obviously, public respondents are invoking the rule that final judgments can no longer be altered in accord with the principle that "it is just as important that there should be a place to end as there should be a place to begin litigation." To start with, the Court is not changing even a comma of its final Decision.
Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General, the rule on finality of judgment cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the well established jurisprudence on this issue as follows:
x x x x x x x x x
the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. . . . For after the judgment has become final facts and circumstances may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible.
In truth, the arguments of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this Court. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, as early as 1915, this Court has unequivocably ruled in the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge of First Instance, viz:
This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the period for reopening the same cannot change or alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated . . . When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to the Executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no power over the person of the convict except to provide for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon.
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state this principle of the common law to render impossible that assertion in absolute terms that after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that after the (court) has performed its ministerial duty of ordering the execution . . . and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution, and there is an imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order a postponement. Then the question arises as to whom the application for postponing the execution ought to be addressed while the circumstances is under investigation and so to who has jurisdiction to make the investigation.
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. To be sure, the important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them conformable to law and justice. For this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that "when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules." It bears repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner.
