PO2 Emmanuel Alteza was assigned as a traffic enforcer. He flagged Rodel Luz who was riding a motorcycle because the latter was not wearing a helmet. There is a municipal ordinance requiring all motorcycle drivers to wear helmets while driving said motor vehicle. PO2 Alteza invited the Luz to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station. While PO2 Alteza and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket. The enforcer was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it. Luz obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container he asked the accused to open it. Upon PO2 Alteza's instruction, the Luz spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search and seizure of the suspected shabu is invalid?
HELD:
Yes, In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the "search incident to arrest" exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. x x x But neither of these underlying rationales for the search incident to arrest exception is sufficient to justify the search in the present case.
We have recognized that the first rationale—officer safety—is "'both legitimate and weighty,'" x x x The threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest. In Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves "danger to an officer" because of "the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station." 414 U. S., at 234-235. We recognized that "[t]he danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest." Id., at 234, n. 5. A routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief encounter and "is more analogous to a so-called 'Terry stop' . . . than to a formal arrest." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973) ("Where there is no formal arrest . . . a person might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to take conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy incriminating evidence").
This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a routine traffic stop.1âwphi1 It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at 110; Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But while the concern for officer safety in this context may justify the "minimal" additional intrusion of ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify the often considerably greater intrusion attending a full fieldtype search. Even without the search authority Iowa urges, officers have other, independent bases to search for weapons and protect themselves from danger. For example, they may order out of a vehicle both the driver, Mimms, supra, at 111, and any passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a "patdown" of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a "Terry patdown" of the passenger compartment of a vehicle upon reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and even conduct a full search of the passenger compartment, including any containers therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest, New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460 (1981).
Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search incident to arrest—the need to discover and preserve evidence. Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further evidence of excessive speed was going to be found either on the person of the offender or in the passenger compartment of the car. (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.22
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.23 Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.24
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible.25 The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused.#END
