By: Von Derek B. Santoninio
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Rodrigo Padillo and Marietta Padillo, respondents, are the owners of Padillo Lending Investor engaged in the money lending business in Lucena City. Their niece, Marissa Padillo-Chua, served as the firms manager. Marissa is married to Wilson Chua, brother of Renita Chua, herein petitioners. One of Marissas functions was to evaluate and recommend loan applications for approval by respondents. Once a loan application had been approved, respondents would authorize the release of a check signed by them or their authorized signatory, a certain Mila Manalo.
Sometime in September 1999, a post-audit was conducted. It was found that Marissa was ngaged in illegal activities. Some of the borrowers whose loan applications she recommended for approval were fictitious and their signatures on the checks were spurious. Marissas modus operandi was to alter the name of the payee appearing on the check by adding another name as an alternative payee. This alternative payee would then personally encash the check with the drawee bank. The cash amounts received were turned over to Marissa or her husband Wilson for deposit in their personal accounts. To facilitate encashment, Marissa would sign the check to signify to the bank that she personally knew the alternative payee. The alternative payees included employees of Wilson or his friends. The total amount embezzled reached P7 million. Respondents filed complaints against petitioners and several others with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Lucena City. In turn, the NBI forwarded their complaints to the Office of the City Prosecutor, same city, for preliminary investigation, docketed as I.S. Nos. 98-1487, 98-1621, 98-1629, and 98-1605.
Forthwith, the City Prosecutor filed an Information for estafa against Marissa, Wilson, and Renita with the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, docketed therein as Criminal Cse No. 99-182. It was raffled of to Branch 59. Believing that a more serious offense should have been charged against petitioners, respondents interposed an appeal to the Secretary of Justice who issued a Resolution dated January 3, 2000.
The Secretary of Justice found that the participation of Wilson Chua in the commission of the crime was not clearly established by the evidence. There was no showing that he abused the trust and confidence of respondents when two (2) of the questioned checks were deposited in his bank account. As to Renita Chua, the Secretary of Justice found no proof of conspiracy between her and Marissa. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied with finality by the
Secretary of Justice on November 6, 2000. The complainants evidence, are shown to be guilty of a crime, he is likewise duty-bound to protect innocent persons from groundless, false, or malicious prosecution.
ISSUE:
Whether ot not the descretionary power of the prosecutors to determine probable cause is with final and absolute?
RULING:
No, the public prosecutors exercise of his discretionary powers is not absolute. First, the resolution of the investigating prosecutor is subject to appeal to the Secretary of Justice who, under the Administrative Code of 1987, as amended, exercises control and supervision over the investigating prosecutor. Thus, the Secretary of Justice may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the ruling of said prosecutor. In special cases, the public prosecutors decision may even be reversed or modified by the Office of the President. Second, the Court of Appeals may review the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, on the ground that he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
Here, we note that the Court of Appeals, on motion for reconsideration by respondents, ruled that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in resolving that only Marissa should be charged. We agree. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. We have carefully examined the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice dated January 3, 2000 wherein he ruled that there was no probable cause to hold Wilson Chua and Renita Chua for estafa through falsification of commercial documents. As found by the Court of Appeals, the Secretary of Justice either overlooked or patently ignored the following circumstances: (1) Marissas practice of depositing checks, with altered names of payees, in the respective accounts of Wilson and Renita Chua; (2) the fact that Wilson and Marissa are husband and wife makes it difficult to believe that one has no idea of the transactions entered into by the other; and (3) the affidavit of Ernesto Alcantara dated November 26, 1998 confirming that Wilson had knowledge of Marissas illegal activities. Indeed, as we ruled in Sanchez v. Demetriou, not even the Supreme Court can order the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case. The only possible exception to this rule is where there is an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutor, as in this case.
