Posted by: Yvonne A. Bioyo; 01 Dec 2018
FACTS:
An altercation occurred between Renato Caparas, husband of respondent, and Villanueva which resulted to the death of Renato. Edna filed a complaint of murder against Villanueva. During the preliminary investigation, both parties presented their affidavits. Finding probable cause, the prosecutor filed a criminal information for homicide against Villanueva. The latter sought reconsideration but was denied. Before he could be arraigned, he filed a petition for review before the DOJ. The Secretary set aside the prosecutor's resolution and directed the prosecutor for the withdrawal of the information. The CA reversed the Secretary's resolution and ordered its reinstatement.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA correctly ruled that the Secretary exceeded the bounds of his jurisdiction when he reversed the prosecutor's resolution finding probable cause to indict Villanueva for Homicide.
HELD:
YES. Probable cause, for purposes of filing criminal information, pertains to facts and circumstances sufficient to incite a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof. Only such facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the respondent are required, not absolute certainty. Probable cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction. The strict validity and merits of a party's accusation or defense, as well as admissibility of testimonies and pieces of evidence, are better ventilated during the trial proper of the case.
The determination of probable cause is essentially an executive function, lodged in the first place on the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation on the offended party's complaint. The prosecutor's ruling is reviewable by the Secretary who, as the final determinative authority on the matter, has the power to reverse, modify or affirm the prosecutor's determination. As a rule, the Secretary's findings are not subject to interference by the courts, save only when he acts with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; or when he grossly misapprehends facts; or acts in a manner so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law; or when he acts outside the contemplation of law.
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