Burgos vs. Court of Appeals

By: Von Derek B. Santoninio, 02 Jan. 2019


The Facts and the Case

On January 7, 1992 a number of assailants attacked the household of Sarah Marie Palma Burgos while all were asleep, killing Sarah and her uncle Erasmo Palma (Erasmo). Another uncle, Victor Palma (Victor), and a friend, Benigno Oquendo (Oquendo), survived the attack. The theory of the police was that a land transaction gone sour between Sarahs live-in partner, David So (David), and respondent Johnny Co (Co) motivated the assault.

Four months after the incident, the police arrested Cresencio Aman (Aman) and Romeo Martin (Martin) who executed confessions, allegedly admitting their part in the attack. They pointed to two others who helped them, namely, Artemio Pong Bergonia and Danilo Say, and to respondent Co who allegedly masterminded the whole thing. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 51, tried the case against Aman and Martin in Criminal Cases 92-104918-21. The three others remained at large. After trial, the RTC acquitted them both. After 10 years or on September 5, 2002 respondent Co surrendered to the National Bureau of Investigation. The prosecution charged him with two counts of murder for the deaths of Sarah and Erasmo and two counts of frustrated murder committed against Oquendo and Victor. Upon arraignment, Co pleaded not guilty to the charges.

On September 25, 2002 respondent Co filed a petition for admission to bail. After hearing or on April 14, 2004, the RTC granted bail on the ground that the evidence of guilt of respondent Co was not strong. The RTC summarized the prosecutions evidence as follows:

1. Aman and Martins extrajudicial confessions that pointed to Co as the one who hired them to kill David and his family.

2. Davids testimony as alleged witness to the killing of Sarah. Aman supposedly told David later when they met that it was Co who ordered the massacre.

3. Police officer Leopoldo Vasquez, assistant leader of the policeteam that investigated the case, said that his team conducted two operations to take Co into custody. The first was in a restaurant where they waited for him. But Co got suspicious and when he saw the police, he immediately left the restaurant, got into his car, and sped away. The police also tried to arrest Co at his residence but the police did not find him there.

Co also offered to settle the case.

The RTC had a low estimate, however, of the above evidence. First, the extrajudicial confessions of Aman and Martin, apart from having been irregularly executed, merely proved their participation in the killing. Neither, however, claimed conspiracy with respondent Co. Further, the prosecution did not present Aman or Martin during the bail hearing, reportedly because Aman was already dead and Martin could not be located. To admit their sworn statements in evidence would deprive Co of his constitutional right to cross-examine them. Second, Davids narrations were, to the RTC, contradictory, uncorroborated, and self-serving, thus lacking in evidentiary weight. Third, police officer Vasquezs story was likewise uncorroborated. Besides, while flight is often indicative of guilt, it requires a clear showing of the identity of the offender and his evasion of arrest. Here, said the RTC, the prosecution failed to establish Cos identity as the assailant and his reason for fleeing from the police. Fourth, the prosecution failed to prove that the offer of settlement came from Co. Petitioner heirs of Sarah moved for reconsideration but the RTC, now presided over by another judge, denied the same in its Order of May 18, 2005. This prompted the victims heirs to file a special civil action of certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 90028.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the special civil action of certiorari, which questioned the RTCs grant of bail to respondent Co, for having been filed in the name of the offended parties and without the OSGs intervention.

RULING:

Instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.  The law allows the merger of the criminal and the civil actions to avoid multiplicity of suits. Thus, when the state succeeds in prosecuting the offense, the offended party benefits from such result and is able to collect the damages awarded to him. But, when the trial court acquits the accused or dismisses the case on the ground of lack of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the civil action is not automatically extinguished since liability under such an action can be determined based on mere preponderance of evidence. The offended party may peel off from the terminated criminal action and appeal from the implied dismissal of his claim for civil liability. The purpose of a criminal action, in its purest sense, is to determine the penal liability of the accused for having outraged the state with his crime and, if he be found guilty, to punish him for it. In this sense, the parties to the action are the People of the Philippines and the accused. The offended party is regarded merely as a witness for the state. Also in this wise, only the state, through its appellate counsel, the OSG, has the sole right and authority to institute proceedings before the CA or the Supreme Court.