G.R. No. 136325, 29 July 2005
Posted by Roque H. Rios Jr. on 24 July 2018
FACTS:
On June 30, 1997, Eugenio C. Delica, respondent, filed with Regional Trial Court, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City, a complaint for cancellation of Deeds of Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title, Joint Venture Agreement, and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order against defendants Manuel M. Serrano, now petitioner, Manuel P. Blanco, MBJ Land, Inc., and MARILAQUE Land, Inc.
The complaint alleges that respondent is the registered owner of ten (10) parcels of land situated in Bagbagan, Muntinlupa City, with a total area of more or less 2,062,475 square meters, covered by ten (10) Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. S-12619 to S-12628 of the Registry of Deeds.
On August 10, 1995, respondent executed in favor of Manuel Blanco a special power of attorney after having been promised with financial bonanza by petitioner and Manuel Blanco. Blanco then sold to MBJ Land, Inc. respondent's three (3) parcel of land covered by TCT Nos. S-12625, S-12626, and S-12628 but these titles were cancelled and TCT Nos. 207282, 207283, and 207284 were issued instead under the name of MBJ Land, Inc., which the latter later on entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with MARILAQUE Land, Inc.
On December 23, 1996, petitioner Serrano again unduly influenced, coerced and intimidated respondent into executing an affidavit wherein he confirmed that he sold his remaining seven parcels of land, covered by TCT Nos. S-12619 to S-126124 and S-12627, to petitioners that later was found to be cancelled and new titles (TCT Nos. 209636 to 209642) were issued in petitioner's name based on a spurious Deed of Absolute Sale.
Respondent prayed in his complaint that the special power of attorney, affidavit, the new titles issued in the names of petitioner and MBJ Land, Inc., and contracts of sale be cancelled; and that petitioner and his co-defendants be ordered to pay respondent, jointly and severally, actual, moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00 as well as attorney's fee at P200,000.00 and costs of litigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent paid the correct docket fee when he filed his complaint.
HELD:
The rule is that upon the filing of the pleading or other application which initiates an action or proceeding, the fees prescribed therefor shall be paid in full. However, a litigant who is a pauper is exempt from the payment of the docket fees. But the fees shall be in lien on the judgment rendered in favor of said pauper litigant, unless the court otherwise provides. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fees that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action.
In the case at bar, petitioner impugns the Court of Appeals' ruling that respondent's complaint is not capable of pecuniary estimation and that, therefore, the docket fee is fixed at P600.00 pursuant to Section 7 (b)(1), Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Honorable court should have considered the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief's sought, the criteria in determining the nature of an action. Respondent's complaint is a real action involving not only the recovery of real properties, but likewise the cancellation of the titles thereto.
Considering that respondent's complaint is a real action, the Rule requires that "the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees."
Neither the assessed value nor the estimated value of the questioned parcels of land were alleged by respondent in both his original and amended complaint. What he stated in his amended complaint is that the disputed realties have a BIR zonal valuation of P1,200.00 per square meter. However, the alleged BIR zonal valuation is not the kind of valuation required by the Rule. It is the assessed value of the realty. Having utterly failed to comply with the requirement of the Rule that he shall allege in his complaint the assessed value of his real properties in controversy, the correct docket fee cannot be computed. As such, his complaint should have been accepted by the trial court. We thus rule that it has not acquired jurisdiction over the present case for failure of herein respondent to pay the required docket fee. On this ground alone, respondent's complaint is vulnerable to dismissal.
