Posted by: Stephanie Tuquib on 25 July 2018
FACTS:
Petitioner Peregrino Rosales was the occupant of a certain portion of Gregorio Wee's property by virtue of a lease agreement on a month-to-month basis. Wee died leaving behind his son and widow. His estate through his son on several occasions requested petitioner to vacate the lot because the heirs wished to put up their own building. Petitioner refused despite the termination of the term of the lease, hence, an action for ejectment against Rosales.
FACTS:
Petitioner Peregrino Rosales was the occupant of a certain portion of Gregorio Wee's property by virtue of a lease agreement on a month-to-month basis. Wee died leaving behind his son and widow. His estate through his son on several occasions requested petitioner to vacate the lot because the heirs wished to put up their own building. Petitioner refused despite the termination of the term of the lease, hence, an action for ejectment against Rosales.
In the unlawful detainer complaint, no lease contract was attached as exhibit in violation of the rule on actionable documents. Further, the MTC judge found that the rules on Summary Procedure was applicable despite the claims exceeding Php 20,000.00. Instead of filing an answer as the appropriate pleading under the rule on summary procedure, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss 10 the complaint where he alleged as grounds, lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action and failure to comply with the rule on actionable documents. On the other hand, because petitioner did not file the appropriate responsive pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure, private respondent moved to declare defendant in default itself, like petitioner's motion to dismiss, a prohibited pleading under Section 15 of the Rule on Summary Procedure.
The trial court found in favor of private respondent, ordered petitioner to vacate the premises and awarded all the damages prayed for by private respondent. The judgment, however, did not deal with the other grounds raised by petitioner. Petitioner further revealed his ignorance of the Rules by filing a motion for reconsideration of the judgment rendered by the Municipal Trial Court, 14 another pleading prohibited under the rule on summary procedure.
Action on the same being unfavorable, petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court. Before said forum, petitioner again committed a blunder: he failed to comply with the order of the court requiring the parties to submit memoranda and thus was not able to sufficiently argue his appeal. The RTC dismissed the appeal affirming in toto the decision of the MTC. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals citing new issues.
The Court of Appeals 17 did not discuss any of the foregoing errors assigned by petitioner and denied due course to the petition solely on the ground that, as claimed by private respondent, the issues raised therein involved a complete change of theory which could not be made for the first time on appeal.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in its assessment that petitioner changed his theory oil appeal.
HELD:
A perusal of the errors assigned by petitioner before respondent court reveals that its assessment is true only in so far the first assigned error, that is, the issue dealing with the legal personality of the estate of Wee and the authority of his son to represent it. The other's concern the questions of jurisdiction, of cause of action and the violation of Rule 8, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, all of which were timely raised before the lower courts. Further, unlike Tiblewhich involves a complete change of theory, no such change of theory obtains in this case. Petitioner merely added another ground to his list of assigned errors committed by the lower courts to buttress his contention that the complaint should have been dismissed. At best, respondent court may have chosen not to deal with said issue on the well settled rule that questions not raised in the lower courts cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 19 The real to entertain the petition as to the other validly raised grounds, however, cannot be justified on the basis of Tible alone whose application is clearly misplaced. Respondent Court of Appeals should, therefore, have gone into the merits of the petition for review filed by petitioner.
Having passed upon the first three assigned errors raised by petitioner with respondent court, We now take a look at his defense of lack of cause of action. He argues that his continued stay on the leased premises is protected by Presidential Decree No. 20 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 inasmuch as the reason relied upon by private respondent, i.e., construction of a bigger commercial building for higher rental income, is not one of those enumerated by the law as grounds for ejectment. Unfortunately for petitioner, he is mistaken. It is clear from Presidential Decree No. 20 20 that the same pertains only to dwelling units or to land on which dwelling units are located, in other words, residential buildings. On the other hand, Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, entitled an Act Regulating Rentals of dwelling Units or of Land on Which Another's Dwelling is Located and for Other Purposes, defines the term residential unit as referring to
an apartment, house and/or land on which another's dwelling is located used for residential purposes and shall include not only buildings, parts or units thereof used solely as dwelling places, except motels, motel room, hotels, hotel rooms, boarding houses, dormitories, rooms and bedspaces for rent, but also those used for home industries, retail stores or other business purposes if the owner thereof and his family actually live therein and use it principally for dwelling purposes: Provided, That in the case of a retail store, home industry or business, the capitalization thereof shall not exceed five thousand pesos (P5,000.00): Provided, further, That in the operation of the store, industry or business, the owner thereof shall not require the services of any person other than the immediate members of his family. 21
In the case of petitioner, it is clear that the building he constructed on the lot of private respondent is devoted purely to commercial purposes. Petitioner operates Ms photography business therein. Not once has petitioner claimed to use the Premises also as a place of residence. The lot itself is located in the commercial district of the municipality. This has been the consistent finding of the lower courts and the same is supported by the representations of petitioner since the beginning. His stay on the leased lot owned by private respondent is unmistakably not countenanced by the rent control laws. To allow petitioner to continue occupying the land would be to deny private respondent the effective exercise of property rights over the same.
To settle this matter once and for all, therefore, the Court finds that petitioner should vacate the land and remove his improvements thereon at his expense. Back rental outstanding must also be paid by petitioner which shall be computed with legal interest at the original monthly rate of P50.00 as if the defective complaint brought by private respondent was not filed at all.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered ordering petitioner to vacate the premises and pay back rental at the monthly rate of P50.00 with legal interest. No other pronouncement as to costs. Let copies of this decision be finished all judges of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in its assessment that petitioner changed his theory oil appeal.
HELD:
A perusal of the errors assigned by petitioner before respondent court reveals that its assessment is true only in so far the first assigned error, that is, the issue dealing with the legal personality of the estate of Wee and the authority of his son to represent it. The other's concern the questions of jurisdiction, of cause of action and the violation of Rule 8, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, all of which were timely raised before the lower courts. Further, unlike Tiblewhich involves a complete change of theory, no such change of theory obtains in this case. Petitioner merely added another ground to his list of assigned errors committed by the lower courts to buttress his contention that the complaint should have been dismissed. At best, respondent court may have chosen not to deal with said issue on the well settled rule that questions not raised in the lower courts cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 19 The real to entertain the petition as to the other validly raised grounds, however, cannot be justified on the basis of Tible alone whose application is clearly misplaced. Respondent Court of Appeals should, therefore, have gone into the merits of the petition for review filed by petitioner.
Having passed upon the first three assigned errors raised by petitioner with respondent court, We now take a look at his defense of lack of cause of action. He argues that his continued stay on the leased premises is protected by Presidential Decree No. 20 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 inasmuch as the reason relied upon by private respondent, i.e., construction of a bigger commercial building for higher rental income, is not one of those enumerated by the law as grounds for ejectment. Unfortunately for petitioner, he is mistaken. It is clear from Presidential Decree No. 20 20 that the same pertains only to dwelling units or to land on which dwelling units are located, in other words, residential buildings. On the other hand, Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, entitled an Act Regulating Rentals of dwelling Units or of Land on Which Another's Dwelling is Located and for Other Purposes, defines the term residential unit as referring to
an apartment, house and/or land on which another's dwelling is located used for residential purposes and shall include not only buildings, parts or units thereof used solely as dwelling places, except motels, motel room, hotels, hotel rooms, boarding houses, dormitories, rooms and bedspaces for rent, but also those used for home industries, retail stores or other business purposes if the owner thereof and his family actually live therein and use it principally for dwelling purposes: Provided, That in the case of a retail store, home industry or business, the capitalization thereof shall not exceed five thousand pesos (P5,000.00): Provided, further, That in the operation of the store, industry or business, the owner thereof shall not require the services of any person other than the immediate members of his family. 21
In the case of petitioner, it is clear that the building he constructed on the lot of private respondent is devoted purely to commercial purposes. Petitioner operates Ms photography business therein. Not once has petitioner claimed to use the Premises also as a place of residence. The lot itself is located in the commercial district of the municipality. This has been the consistent finding of the lower courts and the same is supported by the representations of petitioner since the beginning. His stay on the leased lot owned by private respondent is unmistakably not countenanced by the rent control laws. To allow petitioner to continue occupying the land would be to deny private respondent the effective exercise of property rights over the same.
To settle this matter once and for all, therefore, the Court finds that petitioner should vacate the land and remove his improvements thereon at his expense. Back rental outstanding must also be paid by petitioner which shall be computed with legal interest at the original monthly rate of P50.00 as if the defective complaint brought by private respondent was not filed at all.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered ordering petitioner to vacate the premises and pay back rental at the monthly rate of P50.00 with legal interest. No other pronouncement as to costs. Let copies of this decision be finished all judges of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
