G.R. No. 154599, 21 January 2004
Posted by: Anonymous Contributor
FACTS:
Liga ng mga Barangay is the national organization of all the barangays in the Philippines, which pursuant to Section 492 of Republic Act No. 7160 constitutes the duly elected presidents of highly-urbanized cities, provincial chapters, the metropolitan Manila Chapter, and metropolitan political subdivision chapters.
Section 493 of that law provides that the Liga at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and national levels directly elect a president, a vice-president, and five (5) members of the board of directors. All other matters not provided for in the law affecting the internal organization of the leagues of local government units shall be governed by their respective constitution and by-laws, which must always conform to the provisions of the Constitution and existing laws.
By virtue of the above-cited provision, the Liga adopted and ratified its own Election Code.
On 28 June 2002, respondent City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002, providing, among other things, for the election of representatives of the District Chapters in the City Chapter of Manila and setting the elections for both chapters thirty days after the barangay elections.
Mayor Atienza, signed and approved the city ordinance and issued on 15 August 2002 Executive Order No. 011, Series of 2002, to implement the ordinance.
Hence, this petition for certiorari, originally and directly filed by the petitioner before the Supreme Court, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks the nullification of Manila City Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002 and respondent City Mayors Executive Order No. 011, Series of 2002.
ISSUE:
Whether this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court cognizable by the Supreme Court.
HELD:
No.
For a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law ( Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure ).
Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.
The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the enactment by the City Council of Manila of the assailed ordinance and the issuance by respondent Mayor of the questioned executive order were done in the exercise of legislative and executive functions, respectively, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. On this score alone, certiorari will not lie.
Although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall have the power to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any ordinance is in question. This Court does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.
Even granting arguendo that the present petition is ripe for the extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts. No special and important reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance has been adduced by the petitioner or the intervenor why direct recourse to this Court should be allowed.
