By: Unknown Contributor
FACTS:
On May 21, 1991, private respondents, all surnamed Balane, filed a complaint for "Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Removal of Construction and Damages" against Bertuldo Hinog. Bertuldo filed his Answer alleging ownership of the disputed property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale. However, on June 24, 1998, while trial was still pending, Bertuldo died without completing his evidence.
On August 4, 1998, Atty. Tinampay withdrew as counsel for Bertuldo as his services was terminated by petitioner Bertuldo Hinog III. Atty. Petalcorin then entered his appearance as new counsel for Bertuldo.
Atty. Petalcorin filed a motion to expunge the complaint from the record and nullify all court proceedings on the ground that private respondents failed to specify in the complaint the amount of damages claimed so as to pay the correct docket fees; and that non-payment of the correct docket fee is jurisdictional. The trial court ordered the complaint to be expunged from the records. However, on March 22, 1999, the trial court reinstated the case after private respondents have paid the deficiency docket fee.
On November 24, 1999, petitioners filed before the Supreme Court petition for certiorari and prohibition. They alleged that Judge Melicor committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the case to be reinstated after payment of the deficiency docket fee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not direct recourse to the Supreme Court for Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is proper.
HELD:
No, it is not proper.
The Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared with Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitioners for extraordinary writs.
The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of the Supreme Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve issues because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. The Supreme Court will not entertain direct resort to certiorari unless redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.
The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of the Supreme Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve issues because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. The Supreme Court will not entertain direct resort to certiorari unless redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.
