G.R. No. 192957; 29 Sept. 2014
Posted by Deborah M. Carlos on 24 July 2018
FACTS:
On February 2, 2004, the late Emmanuel B. Moran, Jr. filed with the Consumer Arbitration Office (CAO) a verified complaint against private respondent PGA Cars, Inc. pursuant to the relevant provisions of Republic Act No. 7394 (RA 7394), otherwise known as the Consumer Act of the Philippines. The complaint alleged that the private respondent should be held liable for the product imperfections of a BMW car which it sold to complainant.
On September 23, 2005, the CAO rendered a Decision in favor of complainant and ordered the private respondent to refund the purchase price of the BMW car in addition to the payment of costs of litigation and administrative fines.
On October 19, 2005, the private respondent sought reconsideration of the Decision but the CAO denied the motion in an Order dated January 19, 2006. Thus, the private respondent appealed to the Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the quasi-judicial agency designated by Article 165[8] of RA 7394 to entertain appeals from the adverse decisions and orders of the CAO. However, in a Resolution dated April 28, 2006, the DTI Secretary dismissed the appeal of the private respondent who then filed an appeal with the herein public respondent OP.
On April 3, 2007, the OP granted the appeal, reversed the DTI Secretary's Resolution, and dismissed the complaint. Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration with the OP, but the OP denied said motion in an Order dated October 22, 2008.
On January 23, 2009, complainant filed a petition for certiorari with the CA and alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the OP for ruling on cases involving a violation of RA 7394. On March 13, 2009, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground that it was a wrong mode of appeal and for the failure of the petitioner to state material dates. On June 25, 2010, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration.
Since, Emmanuel B. Moran, Jr. passed away on May 17, 2010, his widow, Concordia V. Moran filed the present petition for review on certiorari on August 9, 2010. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in denying the petition for certiorari which alleged error of jurisdiction on the part of the OP. She contends that in cases alleging error of jurisdiction on the part of the OP, the proper remedy is to file a petition for certiorari with the CA because appeal is not available to correct lack of jurisdiction. Moreover, even though appeal is available, it is not considered as the plain, speedy, and adequate legal remedy.
Respondent argues that the CA was correct in denying the petition for certiorari since this was an improper remedy in view of the availability of an appeal from the OP. Furthermore, the private respondent confirms the appellate jurisdiction of the OP over the DTI based on the constitutional power of control of the OP over Executive Departments and the well-entrenched doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA is correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that petitioner resorted to a wrong mode of appeal.
HELD:
We rule in the negative. Under the Consumer Act (RA 7394), the DTI has the authority and the mandate to act upon complaints filed by consumers pursuant to the State policy of protecting the consumer against deceptive, unfair and unconscionable sales, acts or practices.[12] Said law provided for an arbitration procedure whereby consumer complaints are heard and investigated by consumer arbitration officers whose decisions are appealable to the DTI Secretary. Article 166 thereof provides:
ART. 166. Decision on Appeal. The Secretary shall decide the appeal within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof. The decision becomes final after fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof unless a petition for certiorari is filed with the proper court.
The procedure for appeals to the OP is governed by Administrative Order No. 18, Series of 1987. Section 1 thereof provides:
SECTION 1. Unless otherwise governed by special laws, an appeal to the Office of the President shall be taken within thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrieved party of the decision/resolution/order complained of or appealed from…
In Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation v. The Board of Investments,[15] we interpreted the above provision and declared that "a decision or order issued by a department or agency need not be appealed to the Office of the President when there is a special law that provides for a different mode of appeal."
The executive power of control over the acts of department secretaries is laid down in Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The power of control has been defined as the "power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."
Such "executive control" is not absolute. The definition of the structure of the executive branch of government, and the corresponding degrees of administrative control and supervision is not the exclusive preserve of the executive. It may be effectively limited by the Constitution, by law, or by judicial decisions. All the more in the matter of appellate procedure as in the instant case. Appeals are remedial in nature; hence, constitutionally subject to this Court's rule-making power. The Rules of Procedure was issued by the Court pursuant to Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, which expressly empowers the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning the procedure in all courts.
Parenthetically, Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 18 expressly recognizes an exception to the remedy of appeal to the Office of the President from the decisions of executive departments and agencies. Under Section 1 thereof, a decision or order issued by a department or agency need not be appealed to the Office of the President when there is a special law that provides for a different mode of appeal. In the instant case, the enabling law of respondent BOI, E.O. No. 226, explicitly allows for immediate judicial relief from the decision of respondent BOI involving petitioner's application for an ITH. E.O. No. 226 is a law of special nature and should prevail over A.O. No. 18.
In this case, a special law, RA 7394, likewise expressly provided for immediate judicial relief from decisions of the DTI Secretary by filing a petition for certiorari with the "proper court." Hence, private respondent should have elevated the case directly to the CA through a petition for certiorari.
In filing a petition for certiorari before the CA raising the issue of the OP's lack of jurisdiction, complainant Moran, Jr. thus availed of the proper remedy. The CA thus erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground of being an improper remedy.
Further, we hold that the Resolution dated April 28, 2006 of the DTI Secretary had become FINAL and EXECUTORY with private respondent's failure to appeal the same within the 15-day reglementary period.
