CaseDig: Cang vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 105308. September 25, 1998
Posted by: Michelle M. Bacarra  |  July 25, 2018



FACTS:

This is the question posed before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals affirming the decree of adoption issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 14,[2] in Special Proceedings No. 1744-CEB, In the Matter of the Petition for Adoption of the minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, Spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, petitioner

Keith, Charmaine, and Joseph Anthony are children of spouses Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano. Later during their marriage, Anna Marie learned of her husbands alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos, so she filed a petition for legal separation with alimony pendente litewith the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Cebu which rendered a decision approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that they agreed to live separately and apart or from bed and board. They further agreed: that the children of the childtren shall be entitled to a monthly support of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) effective from the date of the filing of the complaint; that the plaintiff shall be entitled to enter into any contract or agreement with any person or persons, natural or juridical without the written consent of the husband, or any undertaking or acts that ordinarily requires husbands consent as the parties are by this agreement legally separated.

Herbert left for the United States and sought a divorce from Anna Marie before court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decree that also granted sole custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places to petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and never remarried.

While in the United States, petitioner worked in Tablante Medical Clinic earning P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 a month a portion of which was remitted to the Philippines for his childrens expenses and another, deposited in the bank in the name of his children.

On September 25, 1987, private respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed Special Proceedings for the adoption of the three minor Cang children before the RTC of Cebu. Anna Marie filed an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had evaded his legal obligation to support his children; that her brothers and sisters including Ronald V. Clavano, had been helping her in taking care of the children; that because she would be going to the United States to attend to a family business, leaving the children would be a problem and would naturally hamper (her) job-seeking venture abroad; and that her husband had long forfeited his parental rights over the children.

Upon learning of the petition for adoption, Herbert immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition thereto.

The RTC of Cebu City, issued a decree of adoption in favor of spouses Clavano of the minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony all surnamed Cang.

Before the Court of Appeals, Herbert contended that the lower court erred in holding that it would be in the best interest of the three children if they were adopted by private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. He asserted that the petition for adoption was fatally defective and tailored to divest him of parental authority because: (a) he did not have a written consent to the adoption; (b) he never abandoned his children; (c) Keith and Charmaine did not properly give their written consent; and (d) the petitioners for adoption did not present as witness the representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development who made the case study report required by law.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption stating:

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now before this Court, alleging that the petition for adoption was fatally defective as it did not have his written consent as a natural father as required by Article 31 (2) of Presidential Decree No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code, and Article 188 (2) of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner had abandoned his children as to warrant dispensation of his consent to their adoption.


HELD:

Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court. As such, when spouses clavano filed the petition for adoption on September 25, 1987, the applicable law was the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 91.

During the pendency of the petition for adoption or on August 3, 1988, the Family Code which amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code took effect. Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. As amended by the Family Code, the statutory provision on consent for adoption now reads:

Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary:

(1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over;

(2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality;

(3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parent or parents;

(4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parents, if living with said parent and the latters spouse, if any; and

(5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted. (Underscoring supplied)

Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity.Notably, such requirement is also embodied in Rule 99 of the Rules of Court as follows:

SEC. 3. Consent to adoption. There shall be filed with the petition awritten consent to the adoption signed by the child, if fourteen years of age or over and not incompetent, and by the childs spouse, if any, and by each of its known living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the child.

As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child.

The question therefore is whether or not Herbert may be considered as having abandoned the children.

This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate facts and circumstances that should have elicited a different conclusion on the issue of whether petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption unnecessary.

In the instant case, records disclose that petitioners conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment.

Petitioners testimony on the matter is supported by documentary evidence consisting of the following handwritten letters to him of both his wife and children:

Aside from these letters, petitioner also presented certifications of banks in the U.S.A. showing that even prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, he had deposited amounts for the benefit of his children.

There cannot be, therefore, a valid decree of adoption because the finding of the courts on the issue of petitioner's abandonment of his family was based on a misappreciation that was tantamount to non-appreciation, of facts on record.