Posted by Stephanie Tuquib on 25 July 2018
FACTS:
Petitioners Fidel M. Bañares II, Lilia C. Valeriano, Edgar M. Bañares, Emilia Gatchialian and Fidel Besarino were the accused in sixteen criminal cases for estafa filed by the private respondents. The cases were assigned to the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II. After petitioner's arraignment, they then filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that they did not undergo Barangay conciliation with the opposing parties considering that they live in the same barangay and the amount involved does not exceed Two Hundred Pesos (Php 200.00).
FACTS:
Petitioners Fidel M. Bañares II, Lilia C. Valeriano, Edgar M. Bañares, Emilia Gatchialian and Fidel Besarino were the accused in sixteen criminal cases for estafa filed by the private respondents. The cases were assigned to the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II. After petitioner's arraignment, they then filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that they did not undergo Barangay conciliation with the opposing parties considering that they live in the same barangay and the amount involved does not exceed Two Hundred Pesos (Php 200.00).
On November 13, 1995, the municipal trial court issued an Order dismissing the sixteen criminal cases against petitioners without prejudice, pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure (referral to Lupon). Roughly two months after, respondents filed a motion to revive the case on the ground that it already complied with the conciliation proceedings before the Lupon. Petitioners filed their comment and opposition to the same alleging that the order dismissing the case had long been final and executory, hence, respondent's only remedy is to re-file the cases.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not an order dismissing a case or action without prejudice may attain finality if not appealed within the reglementary period, as in the present case;
2. Whether or not the action or case that had been dismissed without prejudice may be revived by motion after the order of dismissal had become final and executory; and
3. Whether or not the court that had originally acquired jurisdiction of the case that was dismissed without prejudice still have jurisdiction to act on the motion to revive after the order of dismissal has become final and executory.
HELD:
Petitioners' contentions are meritorious.
A "final order" issued by a court has been defined as one which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court. 29 As distinguished therefrom, an "interlocutory order" is one which does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon.
This Court has previously held that an order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final order if no motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed.
The law grants an aggrieved party a period of fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the court's decision or order disposing of the action or proceeding to appeal or move to reconsider the same.
After the order of dismissal of a case without prejudice has become final, and therefore becomes outside the court's power to amend and modify, a party who wishes to reinstate the case has no other remedy but to file a new complaint.
Thus, the regional trial court erred when it denied the petition for certiorari, injunction and prohibition and ruled that the order of the municipal trial court, dated November 13, 1995 dismissing without prejudice the criminal cases against petitioners had not attained finality and hence, could be reinstated by the mere filing of a motion to revive.
Equally erroneous is private respondents' contention that the rules regarding finality of judgments under the Revised Rules of Court 40 do not apply to cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Private respondents claim that Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure allows the revival of cases which were dismissed for failure to submit the same to conciliation at the barangay level, as required under Section 412 in relation to Section 408 of the Local Government Code. The said provision states:
Referral to Lupon. — Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 41 where there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after such requirement shall have been complied with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused was arrested without a warrant. 42
There is nothing in the aforecited provision which supports private respondents' view. Section 18 merely states that when a case covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is dismissed without prejudice for non-referral of the issues to the Lupon, the same may be revived only after the dispute subject of the dismissed case is submitted to barangay conciliation as required under the Local Government Code. There is no declaration to the effect that said case may be revived by mere motion even after the fifteen-day period within which to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration has lapsed.
Moreover, the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure expressly provides that the Rules of Court applies suppletorily to cases covered by the former:
Sec. 22. Applicability of the regular rules. — The regular procedure prescribed in the Rules of Court shall apply to the special cases herein provided for in a suppletory capacity insofar as they are not inconsistent therewith. 43
Nothing in Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure conflicts with the prevailing rule that a judgment or order which is not appealed or made subject of a motion for reconsideration within the prescribed fifteen-day period attains finality. 46 Hence, the principle expressed in the maxim interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi, or that every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence 47 applies in interpreting both sets of Rules.
The rationale behind the doctrine of finality of judgments and orders, likewise, supports our conclusion that said doctrine applies to cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure:
The doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgments of the courts must become final at some definite date set by law. 48
It is but logical to infer that the foregoing principle also applies to cases subject to summary procedure especially since the objective of the Rule governing the same is precisely to settle these cases expeditiously.
The Court also finds it necessary to correct the mistaken impression of petitioners and the municipal trial court that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation as required under the Local Government Code of 1991 51 may be raised in a motion to dismiss even after the accused has been arraigned.
It is well-settled that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so required under the law 52 is not jurisdictional in nature 53 and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss. 54The Court notes that although petitioners could have invoked the ground of prematurity of the causes of action against them due to the failure to submit the dispute to Lupon prior to the filing of the cases as soon as they received the complaints against them, petitioners raised the said ground only after their arraignment.
However, while the trial court committed an error in dismissing the criminal cases against petitioners on the ground that the same were not referred to the Lupon prior to the filing thereof in court although said ground was raised by them belatedly, the said order may no longer be revoked at present considering that the same had already become final and executory, and as earlier stated, may no longer be annulled 55 by the Municipal Trial Court, nor by the Regional Trial Court or this Court.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not an order dismissing a case or action without prejudice may attain finality if not appealed within the reglementary period, as in the present case;
2. Whether or not the action or case that had been dismissed without prejudice may be revived by motion after the order of dismissal had become final and executory; and
3. Whether or not the court that had originally acquired jurisdiction of the case that was dismissed without prejudice still have jurisdiction to act on the motion to revive after the order of dismissal has become final and executory.
HELD:
Petitioners' contentions are meritorious.
A "final order" issued by a court has been defined as one which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court. 29 As distinguished therefrom, an "interlocutory order" is one which does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon.
This Court has previously held that an order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final order if no motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed.
The law grants an aggrieved party a period of fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the court's decision or order disposing of the action or proceeding to appeal or move to reconsider the same.
After the order of dismissal of a case without prejudice has become final, and therefore becomes outside the court's power to amend and modify, a party who wishes to reinstate the case has no other remedy but to file a new complaint.
Thus, the regional trial court erred when it denied the petition for certiorari, injunction and prohibition and ruled that the order of the municipal trial court, dated November 13, 1995 dismissing without prejudice the criminal cases against petitioners had not attained finality and hence, could be reinstated by the mere filing of a motion to revive.
Equally erroneous is private respondents' contention that the rules regarding finality of judgments under the Revised Rules of Court 40 do not apply to cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Private respondents claim that Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure allows the revival of cases which were dismissed for failure to submit the same to conciliation at the barangay level, as required under Section 412 in relation to Section 408 of the Local Government Code. The said provision states:
Referral to Lupon. — Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 41 where there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after such requirement shall have been complied with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused was arrested without a warrant. 42
There is nothing in the aforecited provision which supports private respondents' view. Section 18 merely states that when a case covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is dismissed without prejudice for non-referral of the issues to the Lupon, the same may be revived only after the dispute subject of the dismissed case is submitted to barangay conciliation as required under the Local Government Code. There is no declaration to the effect that said case may be revived by mere motion even after the fifteen-day period within which to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration has lapsed.
Moreover, the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure expressly provides that the Rules of Court applies suppletorily to cases covered by the former:
Sec. 22. Applicability of the regular rules. — The regular procedure prescribed in the Rules of Court shall apply to the special cases herein provided for in a suppletory capacity insofar as they are not inconsistent therewith. 43
Nothing in Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure conflicts with the prevailing rule that a judgment or order which is not appealed or made subject of a motion for reconsideration within the prescribed fifteen-day period attains finality. 46 Hence, the principle expressed in the maxim interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi, or that every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence 47 applies in interpreting both sets of Rules.
The rationale behind the doctrine of finality of judgments and orders, likewise, supports our conclusion that said doctrine applies to cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure:
The doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgments of the courts must become final at some definite date set by law. 48
It is but logical to infer that the foregoing principle also applies to cases subject to summary procedure especially since the objective of the Rule governing the same is precisely to settle these cases expeditiously.
The Court also finds it necessary to correct the mistaken impression of petitioners and the municipal trial court that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation as required under the Local Government Code of 1991 51 may be raised in a motion to dismiss even after the accused has been arraigned.
It is well-settled that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so required under the law 52 is not jurisdictional in nature 53 and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss. 54The Court notes that although petitioners could have invoked the ground of prematurity of the causes of action against them due to the failure to submit the dispute to Lupon prior to the filing of the cases as soon as they received the complaints against them, petitioners raised the said ground only after their arraignment.
However, while the trial court committed an error in dismissing the criminal cases against petitioners on the ground that the same were not referred to the Lupon prior to the filing thereof in court although said ground was raised by them belatedly, the said order may no longer be revoked at present considering that the same had already become final and executory, and as earlier stated, may no longer be annulled 55 by the Municipal Trial Court, nor by the Regional Trial Court or this Court.
