Posted by: The WinLawSuites Team, 05 August 2018
FACTS:
In a buy-bust operation, Jay-ar Senin was arrested by elements of the PNP of San Fabian, Pangasinan. During inquest proceedings, he availed of his rightto preliminary investigation and executed a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the RPC. After the preliminary investigation, the prosecutor dismissed the case against him. Pursuant to the then prevailing DOJ Circular, the case was forwarded to the DOJ for automatic review. In the meantime, pursuant to such DOJ Circular, Senin remained detained in custody pending review by the DOJ of his case.
The IBP filed the instant Petiton for issuance of Writ of Kalayaan claiming that the waiver of Article 125 of the RPC does not vest the DOJ, Provincial Prosecutor's Office (PPO), Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), and the PNP, the unbridled right to detain Senin indefinitely subject only to the whims and caprices of the reviewing prosecutor of the DOJ, adding that Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that preliminary investigation must be terminated within 15 days from its inception if the person arrested had requested for a preliminary investigation and had signed a waiver of the provisions of Article 125.
It follows, therefore, IBP argued, that the waiver of Article 125 must coincide with the 15-day period of preliminary investigation. The detention beyond this period violates Senin's constitutional right to liberty. The review of the investigating prosecutor's resolution has been pending with the DOJ for more than eight months. The IBP concludes that Senin must be released from detention and be relieved from the effects of the unconstitutional issuances of the DOJ.
Thus, the petition prays that the Court: a) declare that pursuant to A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC, the petitioner is exempt from the payment of filing fees; b) issue a writ of habeas corpus directing the release of Senin; c) declare the aforementioned issuances of the DOJ as unconstitutional; d) immediately set the case for hearing due to its urgency; and e) issue a writ of kalayaan directing the release of all detention prisoners in a similar plight.
During the pendency of the Petition, the DOJ reversed the prosecutor's finding of lack of probable cause and filed an Information in court for violation of RA No. 9165 against Senin. He was then committed to the BJMP where he was detained to face trial. Moreover, DOJ Secretary Vitaliano Aguirre II also revoked the department's circular that authorized the detention of persons arrested and awaiting results of the automatic review of their cases by the DOJ, and ordered their immediate released.
The OSG argues that the Petition should be dismissed for having become moot with the filing of the Information in court and the DOJ's revocation of its circular. On the other hand, respondent BJMP justifies its continued custody of Senin until a court order is issued revoking the commitment order or authorizing the release of Senin.
ISSUES:
- Whether or not the Petition be dismissed for having become moot.
- Did Senin's waiver of the provisions of Art. 125, RPC, vest the DOJ, PNP, and BJMP unbridled authority to detain Senin?
- Whether or not the continued detention of Senin is lawful.
HELD:
1. The Petition should not be dismissed despite its mootness.
Although the latest circular of Secretary Aguirre is laudable as it adheres to the constitutional provisions on the rights of pre-trial detainees, the Court will not dismiss the case on the ground of mootness. As can be gleaned from the ever-changing DOJ circulars, there is a possibility that the latest circular would again be amended by succeeding secretaries. It has been repeatedly held that "the Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest are involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.5 All four (4) requisites are present in this case.
As the case is prone to being repeated as a result of constant changes, the Court, as the guardian and final arbiter of the Constitution6 and pursuant to its prerogative to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,7 takes this opportunity to lay down controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public on the propriety of the continued detention of an arrested person whose case has been dismissed on inquest, preliminary investigation, reinvestigation, or appeal but pending automatic review by the SOJ.
2. Waiver of Article 125 not a license to detain a person indefinitely.
The rule is that a person subject of a warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities within the periods provided in Article 125 of the RPC, otherwise, the public official or employee could be held liable for the failure to deliver except if grounded on reasonable and allowable delays. Article 125 of the RPC is intended to prevent any abuse resulting from confining a person without informing him of his offense and without allowing him to post bail. It punishes public officials or employees who shall detain any person for some legal ground but fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the periods prescribed by law. In case the detention is without legal ground, the person arrested can charge the arresting officer with arbitrary detention under Article 124 of the RPC. This is without prejudice to the possible filing of an action for damages under Article 32 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.
Article 125 of the RPC, however, can be waived if the detainee who was validly arrested without a warrant opts for the conduct of preliminary investigation.1âwphi1 The question to be addressed here, therefore, is whether such waiver gives the State the right to detain a person indefinitely.
The Court answers in the negative.
The waiver of Article 125 of the RPC does not vest upon the DOJ, PPO, BJMP, and PNP the unbridled right to indefinitely incarcerate an arrested person and subject him to the whims and caprices of the reviewing prosecutor of the DOJ. The waiver of Article 125 must coincide with the prescribed period for preliminary investigation as mandated by Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Detention beyond this period violates the accused's constitutional right to liberty.
Stated differently, the waiver of the effects of Article 125 of the RPC is not a license to detain a person ad infinitum. Waiver of a detainee's right to be delivered to proper judicial authorities as prescribed by Article 125 of the RPC does not trump his constitutional right in cases where probable cause was initially found wanting by reason of the dismissal of the complaint filed before the prosecutor's office even if such dismissal is on appeal, reconsideration, reinvestigation or on automatic review. Every person's basic right to liberty is not to be construed as waived by mere operation of Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The fundamental law provides limits and this must be all the more followed especially so that detention is proscribed absent probable cause.
3. Senin's continued detention was unlawful
Accordingly, the Court rules that a detainee under such circumstances must be promptly released to avoid violation of the constitutional right to liberty, despite a waiver of Article 125, if the 15-day period (or the thirty 30- day period in cases of violation of R.A. No. 91659 ) for the conduct of the preliminary investigation lapses. This rule also applies in cases where the investigating prosecutor resolves to dismiss the case, even if such dismissal was appealed to the DOJ or made the subject of a motion for reconsideration, reinvestigation or automatic review. The reason is that such dismissal automatically results in a prima facie finding of lack of probable cause to file an information in court and to detain a person.
The Court is aware that this decision may raise discomfort to some, especially at this time when the present administration aggressively wages its "indisputably popular war on illegal drugs." As Justice Diosdado Peralta puts it, that the security of the public and the interest of the State would be jeopardized is not a justification to trample upon the constitutional rights of the detainees against deprivation of liberty without due process of law, to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and to a speedy disposition of the case.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared, and ruled, that all detainees whose pending cases have gone beyond the mandated periods for the conduct of preliminary investigation, or whose cases have already been dismissed on inquest or preliminary investigation, despite pending appeal, reconsideration, reinvestigation or automatic review by the Secretary of Justice, are entitled to be released pursuant to their constitutional right to liberty and their constitutional right against unreasonable seizures, unless detained for some other lawful cause.
