Posted by: Helene Grace on July 26, 2018
FACTS:
Petitioner Amelia M. Cabrera entered into a lease agreement with the Municipality of Sasmuan over a tract of land for fishpond operations. An amount of P5,000,000.00 was spent by petitioner for its construction before it commenced. Thus, petitioner sent the fishpond administrator to dissuade respondents from destroying her property after knowing from the newspaper reports that her fishpond was purportedly illegal and as it blocked the flow of Pasak River.
However, despite the pleas of petitioner, her fishpond was demolished through dynamite blasting. Petitoner alleged that such demolition was purposely carried out in the presence of media representatives and other government officials to gain media mileage. Further, petitioner imputed evident bad faith on respondents Mayor Baltazar et al. which they allow the demolition of fishpond despite the knowledge of the lease agreement. She also charged respondents Governor Lapid and Senior Superintendent Ventura with gross inexcusable negligence for ordering the destruction of the fishpond without first verifying its legality.
The Ombudsman issued the assailed Resolution, dismissing petitioner's complaint. The dismissal was based on the declaration that the fishpond was a nuisance per se and, thus, may be abated by respondents in the exercise of the police power of the State.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Resolution, arguing that under Sec. 149 of Republic Act(R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges is vested in the municipalities. Petitioner also questioned the certification by the Municipal Health Officer, alleging that the same was issued before the ocular inspection of the property which took place only on the day of the demolition. Petitioner also contended that a judicial proceeding was necessary to determine whether the property indeed had caused the flooding. Respondents filed separate oppositions to petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed a reply to the opposition and Governor Lapid filed are joinder to the reply.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuances of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 is valid.
HELD:
Yes. The petitioner cannot avail Sec. 27 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989. It is provided that direct appeals are allowed in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court. Hence, the right to appeal is granted only in respect to orders or decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases.
The provision does not cover resolutions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases. However, an aggrieved party in criminal actions is not without any recourse. Where grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction taints the findings of the Ombudsman on the existence of probable cause, the aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The remedy from resolutions of the Ombudsman in preliminary investigations of criminal cases is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
In the case at bar, petitioner has taken the position that the Ombudsman has decided questions of substance contrary to law and the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court. That is a ground under a Rule 45 petition. Indeed, from a reading of the assignment of errors, it is clear that petitioner does not impute grave abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman in issuing the assailed Resolution and Order. Rather, she merely questions his findings and conclusions. As stated earlier, direct appeal to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari is not sanctioned by any rule of procedure. By availing of a wrong remedy, the petition should be dismissed outright.
Even if the Court treats the instant appeal as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, its dismissal is nevertheless warranted because petitioner failed to present, much more substantiate, any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman. A careful reading of the questioned Resolution reveals that the Ombudsman dismissed petitioner's criminal complaint because respondents had validly resorted to the police power of the State when they effected the demolition of the illegal fishpond in question following the declaration thereof as a nuisance per se. Thus, the Ombudsman was of the opinion that no violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or of Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code was committed by respondents. In the words of the Ombudsman, "those who participated in the blasting of the subject fishpond were only impelled by their desire to serve the best interest of the general public; for the good and the highest good. "The other errors raised by petitioner pertain to the Ombudsman's opinion on the lack of probable cause to indict respondents. These are purported errors in judgment which can be corrected by an appeal, although not via a direct appeal to this Court. Direct resort to this Court may be had only through the extraordinary writ of certiorari and upon showing that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion, which petitioner failed to demonstrate.
FACTS:
Petitioner Amelia M. Cabrera entered into a lease agreement with the Municipality of Sasmuan over a tract of land for fishpond operations. An amount of P5,000,000.00 was spent by petitioner for its construction before it commenced. Thus, petitioner sent the fishpond administrator to dissuade respondents from destroying her property after knowing from the newspaper reports that her fishpond was purportedly illegal and as it blocked the flow of Pasak River.
However, despite the pleas of petitioner, her fishpond was demolished through dynamite blasting. Petitoner alleged that such demolition was purposely carried out in the presence of media representatives and other government officials to gain media mileage. Further, petitioner imputed evident bad faith on respondents Mayor Baltazar et al. which they allow the demolition of fishpond despite the knowledge of the lease agreement. She also charged respondents Governor Lapid and Senior Superintendent Ventura with gross inexcusable negligence for ordering the destruction of the fishpond without first verifying its legality.
The Ombudsman issued the assailed Resolution, dismissing petitioner's complaint. The dismissal was based on the declaration that the fishpond was a nuisance per se and, thus, may be abated by respondents in the exercise of the police power of the State.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Resolution, arguing that under Sec. 149 of Republic Act(R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges is vested in the municipalities. Petitioner also questioned the certification by the Municipal Health Officer, alleging that the same was issued before the ocular inspection of the property which took place only on the day of the demolition. Petitioner also contended that a judicial proceeding was necessary to determine whether the property indeed had caused the flooding. Respondents filed separate oppositions to petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed a reply to the opposition and Governor Lapid filed are joinder to the reply.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuances of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 is valid.
HELD:
Yes. The petitioner cannot avail Sec. 27 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989. It is provided that direct appeals are allowed in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court. Hence, the right to appeal is granted only in respect to orders or decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases.
The provision does not cover resolutions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases. However, an aggrieved party in criminal actions is not without any recourse. Where grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction taints the findings of the Ombudsman on the existence of probable cause, the aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The remedy from resolutions of the Ombudsman in preliminary investigations of criminal cases is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
In the case at bar, petitioner has taken the position that the Ombudsman has decided questions of substance contrary to law and the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court. That is a ground under a Rule 45 petition. Indeed, from a reading of the assignment of errors, it is clear that petitioner does not impute grave abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman in issuing the assailed Resolution and Order. Rather, she merely questions his findings and conclusions. As stated earlier, direct appeal to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari is not sanctioned by any rule of procedure. By availing of a wrong remedy, the petition should be dismissed outright.
Even if the Court treats the instant appeal as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, its dismissal is nevertheless warranted because petitioner failed to present, much more substantiate, any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman. A careful reading of the questioned Resolution reveals that the Ombudsman dismissed petitioner's criminal complaint because respondents had validly resorted to the police power of the State when they effected the demolition of the illegal fishpond in question following the declaration thereof as a nuisance per se. Thus, the Ombudsman was of the opinion that no violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or of Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code was committed by respondents. In the words of the Ombudsman, "those who participated in the blasting of the subject fishpond were only impelled by their desire to serve the best interest of the general public; for the good and the highest good. "The other errors raised by petitioner pertain to the Ombudsman's opinion on the lack of probable cause to indict respondents. These are purported errors in judgment which can be corrected by an appeal, although not via a direct appeal to this Court. Direct resort to this Court may be had only through the extraordinary writ of certiorari and upon showing that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion, which petitioner failed to demonstrate.
