CaseDig: La'o vs. Republic

G.R. No. 160719, 23 January 2006
Posted by: Eileen Shiella A. Dialimas on 30 July 2018


In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Emilio Gonzales La'O seeks to reverse the June 27, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 62580, affirming in toto the decision of Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila and the CA's November 10, 2003 resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.


FACTS:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) is the registered owner of three parcels of land with an area of around 821 square meters, with a five-storey building and the other improvements thereon. The property is situated at the corner of Mabini and Arquiza streets in Ermita, Manila

On June 22, 1978, the GSIS and the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), entered into a "lease-purchase" agreement (first contract). GSIS agreed to transfer the property to the OGCC for a consideration of P1.5 million, payable in equal yearly amortization-lease rentals of P100,000 for a period of 15 years.

On December 22, 1980, petitioner offered to purchase the property. On May 10, 1982, GSIS and petitioner executed a "lease-purchase" agreement (second contract). GSIS agreed to sell the same property to petitioner for P2,000,000, with a down payment of P200,000 and the balance payable within a period of 15 years at 12% interest per annum, compounded yearly.

Under the second contract, GSIS obligated itself to construct for the OGCC a three-storey building on the Manila Bay reclaimed area or to make available another property acceptable to the OGCC, to be conveyed to the Republic under the same or mutually acceptable terms and conditions as those of the first contract. In the meantime, the OGCC was allowed to continue occupying the second to the fifth floors of the building at an annual rental of P100,000, payable to petitioner.11 Furthermore, petitioner was entitled to lease out the ground floor and collect the corresponding rentals.

It appears that on April 11, 1982, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos approved the second contract by scribbling on the right upper hand corner "11 April 1982 – Approved – Ferdinand E. Marcos."13 On April 23, 1982, the GSIS Board of Trustees approved the same.14
In 1989, after the overthrow of Marcos (in 1986), respondents filed before the RTC of Manila, Branch 41 a complaint against petitioner

Respondents prayed for the nullification of the second contract and the forfeiture of all payments made by petitioner to the GSIS in favor of the Republic, through the OGCC, which payments were to be deemed payments by the Republic to the GSIS under the first contract.

The trial court rendered in favor of respondents. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Hence this petition. Petitioner also asserts that it is the Sandiganbayan, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over this "ill-gotten wealth" case because the complaint involved the annulment of a fraudulent conveyance of government property to a Marcos crony and the recovery of such "ill-gotten wealth" by the government. Furthermore, for failure to consolidate this civil case with the criminal case in the Sandiganbayan [charging petitioner with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019], this case should be considered abandoned.


ISSUE:

 Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the case.


RULING:
No. Petitioner's contention has no merit.

Petitioner argued and discussed this particular issue for the first time in his memorandum before this Court. While it is true that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be raised at any stage of the proceedings since it is conferred by law, it is nevertheless settled that a party may be barred from raising it on the ground of estoppel. After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is improper and too late for the losing party to question the jurisdiction of the court. A party who has invoked the jurisdiction of a court over a particular matter to secure affirmative relief cannot be permitted to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape liability. Thus petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the courts below.