By: Maymay D. Tocalo, August 16, 2018
FACTS:
Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized to operate and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized under Section 13 of the City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked. May 17, 2003, the respondents Ang, Balajadia and John Doe dismantled, took and carried away the clamp attached to the left front wheel of owned by Ang. Accordingly, the car was then illegally parked and left unattended at a Loading and Unloading Zone. The Affidavit-Complaint was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23, 2003. A preliminary investigation took place on May 28, 2003.
On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City dated July 25, 2003. Balajadia and the other accused filed a Motion to Quash and/or Manifestations on February 2, 2004. The Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation sought the quashal of the two Informations on the following grounds: extinguishment of criminal action or liability due to prescription; failure of the Informations to state facts that charged an offense; and the imposition of charges on respondents with more than one offense. Judge Lidua of Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, granted the accused's Motion to Quash and dismissed the cases. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense charged against respondents.
HELD:
No, as provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance. The respondent judge was correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes. In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also featured similar facts and issues with the present case. In that case, the offense was committed on May 11, 1990. The Complaint was received on May 30, 1990, and the Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990.
There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in the Rules of Criminal Procedure and in the Rules of Summary Procedure. When the representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It continued to run until the filing of the Information. They had two months to file the Information and institute the judicial proceedings by filing the Information with the Municipal Trial Court. The conduct of the preliminary investigation, the original charge of Robbery, and the subsequent finding of the violation of the ordinance did not alter the period within which to file the Information. Respondents were correct in arguing that the petitioner only had two months from the discovery and commission of the offense before it prescribed within which to file the Information with the Municipal Trial Court.
Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5, 2003, the period had already prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when he ordered the dismissal of the case against respondents. It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances and their prescription period. It also upholds the necessity of filing the Information in court in order to toll the period. Zaldivia also has this to say concerning the effects of its ruling: The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a dist0rtion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.
FACTS:
Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized to operate and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized under Section 13 of the City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked. May 17, 2003, the respondents Ang, Balajadia and John Doe dismantled, took and carried away the clamp attached to the left front wheel of owned by Ang. Accordingly, the car was then illegally parked and left unattended at a Loading and Unloading Zone. The Affidavit-Complaint was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23, 2003. A preliminary investigation took place on May 28, 2003.
On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City dated July 25, 2003. Balajadia and the other accused filed a Motion to Quash and/or Manifestations on February 2, 2004. The Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation sought the quashal of the two Informations on the following grounds: extinguishment of criminal action or liability due to prescription; failure of the Informations to state facts that charged an offense; and the imposition of charges on respondents with more than one offense. Judge Lidua of Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, granted the accused's Motion to Quash and dismissed the cases. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense charged against respondents.
HELD:
No, as provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance. The respondent judge was correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes. In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also featured similar facts and issues with the present case. In that case, the offense was committed on May 11, 1990. The Complaint was received on May 30, 1990, and the Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990.
There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in the Rules of Criminal Procedure and in the Rules of Summary Procedure. When the representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It continued to run until the filing of the Information. They had two months to file the Information and institute the judicial proceedings by filing the Information with the Municipal Trial Court. The conduct of the preliminary investigation, the original charge of Robbery, and the subsequent finding of the violation of the ordinance did not alter the period within which to file the Information. Respondents were correct in arguing that the petitioner only had two months from the discovery and commission of the offense before it prescribed within which to file the Information with the Municipal Trial Court.
Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5, 2003, the period had already prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when he ordered the dismissal of the case against respondents. It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances and their prescription period. It also upholds the necessity of filing the Information in court in order to toll the period. Zaldivia also has this to say concerning the effects of its ruling: The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a dist0rtion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.
