Posted by: Vincent Albien V. Arnado on 31 July 2018
FACTS:
1st of March, 1913, Constancio Joaquin, believing himself entitled to a license to open and exploit a cockpit in the municipality of Caloocan, and the authorities thereof refusing to issue it to him, began an action against Godofredo B. Herrera as municipal president of said municipality, the officer whose duty he claimed it was to issue cockpit licenses, to obtain a mandamus compelling said official to issue such license alleging that the court below and had acted without jurisdiction in the following particulars:
1. That the said Honorable Alberto Barretto exceeded his jurisdiction in issuing a mandatory injunction, because, according to paragraph ( j), section 40, of the Municipal Code and article 4 of municipal ordinance No. 8 of Caloocan (Exhibit 1 a), the issuance of cockpit licenses in Loma and Maypajo does not pertain to the municipal president of Caloocan but to the municipal council thereof.
2. That the said Honorable Alberto Barretto exceeded his jurisdiction in issuing the mandatory injunction ex parte without giving the municipal president opportunity to show cause why such injunction should not be issued as required by section 202 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
3. That the said Alberto Barretto exceeded his jurisdiction in issuing such mandatory injunction for the reason that the cockpit license which the president of Caloocan had erroneously issued in favor of Constancio Joaquin, on the day of __________, 1913, has been annulled and cancelled by virtue of ordinance No. _____ of the municipal council of Caloocan, which ordinance has been duly approved by the provincial board of Rizal.
4. That there being another action pending between the same parties, founded upon the same facts and reasons, the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no jurisdiction to issue the mandatory injunction of the 1st of March, 1913 (Exhibit 4), for the reason that such injunction tends to render inefficacious and null the final decision which this honorable court will render in civil case No. 8673.
5. That there being pending civil case No. 986 mentioned in the previous paragraphs, the Court of First Instance of Rizal lacked jurisdiction to issue the mandatory injunction which he issued on the 1st of March, 1913, for the reason that it tends to render inefficacious and null the decision which the Honorable Richard Campbell will render in civil cause No. 986.
6. That the said Constancio Joaquin at the present time does not possess a license to maintain and run the said cockpits of Loma and Maypajo, nor does he have the right to exploit the same.
FACTS:
1st of March, 1913, Constancio Joaquin, believing himself entitled to a license to open and exploit a cockpit in the municipality of Caloocan, and the authorities thereof refusing to issue it to him, began an action against Godofredo B. Herrera as municipal president of said municipality, the officer whose duty he claimed it was to issue cockpit licenses, to obtain a mandamus compelling said official to issue such license alleging that the court below and had acted without jurisdiction in the following particulars:
1. That the said Honorable Alberto Barretto exceeded his jurisdiction in issuing a mandatory injunction, because, according to paragraph ( j), section 40, of the Municipal Code and article 4 of municipal ordinance No. 8 of Caloocan (Exhibit 1 a), the issuance of cockpit licenses in Loma and Maypajo does not pertain to the municipal president of Caloocan but to the municipal council thereof.
2. That the said Honorable Alberto Barretto exceeded his jurisdiction in issuing the mandatory injunction ex parte without giving the municipal president opportunity to show cause why such injunction should not be issued as required by section 202 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
3. That the said Alberto Barretto exceeded his jurisdiction in issuing such mandatory injunction for the reason that the cockpit license which the president of Caloocan had erroneously issued in favor of Constancio Joaquin, on the day of __________, 1913, has been annulled and cancelled by virtue of ordinance No. _____ of the municipal council of Caloocan, which ordinance has been duly approved by the provincial board of Rizal.
4. That there being another action pending between the same parties, founded upon the same facts and reasons, the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no jurisdiction to issue the mandatory injunction of the 1st of March, 1913 (Exhibit 4), for the reason that such injunction tends to render inefficacious and null the final decision which this honorable court will render in civil case No. 8673.
5. That there being pending civil case No. 986 mentioned in the previous paragraphs, the Court of First Instance of Rizal lacked jurisdiction to issue the mandatory injunction which he issued on the 1st of March, 1913, for the reason that it tends to render inefficacious and null the decision which the Honorable Richard Campbell will render in civil cause No. 986.
6. That the said Constancio Joaquin at the present time does not possess a license to maintain and run the said cockpits of Loma and Maypajo, nor does he have the right to exploit the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court acted with jurisdiction.
HELD:
It has been urged that the court exceeded its jurisdiction in requiring the municipal president to issue the license, for the reason that he was not the proper person to issue it and that, if he was the proper person, he had the right to exercise a discretion as to whom the license should be issued. We do not believe that either of these questions goes to the jurisdiction of the court to act. One of the fundamental questions in a mandamus against a public officer is whether or not that officer has the right to exercise discretion in the performance of the act which the plaintiff asks him to perform. It is one of the essential determination of the cause. To claim that the resolution of that question may deprive the court of jurisdiction is to assert a novel proposition. It is equivalent to the contention that a court has jurisdiction if he decides right but no jurisdiction if he decides wrong. It may be stated generally that it is never necessary to decide the fundamental questions of a cause to determine whether the court has jurisdiction. The question of jurisdiction is preliminary and never touches the merits of the case. The determination of the fundamental questions of a cause are merely the exercise of a jurisdiction already conceded. In the case at bar no one denies the power, authority, or jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to take cognizance of an action for mandamus and to decide every question which arises in that cause and pertains thereto. The contention that the decision of one of those questions, if wrong, destroys jurisdiction involves an evident contradiction.
