Posted by: Ocace Dave R. Maramara on July 26, 2018
FACTS:
Sec. 9 RA 4670 provides that administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who should at least have the rank of a division supervisor.
Under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies should be taken to the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner Gonzales, a public school teacher was facing a complaint for grave misconduct, dishonesty and estafa. Respondent Rosas, then DECS-National Capital Region Director dismissed petitioner from the service based from the initial administrative proceeding conducted by Nagpacan, the Administrative Officer III of City Schools
Petitioner filed an administrative complaint for violation of Sec. 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers against the respondents before the Office of the Ombudsman instead of a judicial relief for resolution of the jurisdictional issue and declaration of nullity of the administrative proceeding.
Petitioner filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari on the ground that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in adopting Director Baliton's memorandum recommending the dismissal of her complaint against the DECS officials for want of merit. The CA dismissed the case as the proper remedy was a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
FACTS:
Sec. 9 RA 4670 provides that administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who should at least have the rank of a division supervisor.
Under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies should be taken to the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner Gonzales, a public school teacher was facing a complaint for grave misconduct, dishonesty and estafa. Respondent Rosas, then DECS-National Capital Region Director dismissed petitioner from the service based from the initial administrative proceeding conducted by Nagpacan, the Administrative Officer III of City Schools
Petitioner filed an administrative complaint for violation of Sec. 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers against the respondents before the Office of the Ombudsman instead of a judicial relief for resolution of the jurisdictional issue and declaration of nullity of the administrative proceeding.
Petitioner filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari on the ground that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in adopting Director Baliton's memorandum recommending the dismissal of her complaint against the DECS officials for want of merit. The CA dismissed the case as the proper remedy was a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioner contends that she could not file a petition for review under Rule 43 as it only pertains to appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals, implying that the Office of the Ombudsman is not a quasi-judicial agency.
ISSUE:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman is a quasi-judicial agency.
HELD:
HELD:
Yes. The Office of the Ombudsman is a quasi-judicial agency covered by the procedure outlined in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As a rule, appeals from decisions of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Office of the ombudsman, in administrative disciplinary cases, should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43. The rule was formulated precisely to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies. Thus, certiorari under Rule 65 will not lie, as appeal under Rule 43 is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to appeal within fifteen (15) days from notice of the assailed decision. Certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be resorted to as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal, especially if such lapse was occasioned by petitioner's neglect or error in the choice of remedies, for the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.
