By: Maymay D. Tocalo, August 16, 2018
FACTS:
Private respondent was filed a complaint against petitioners for forcible entry in the MTCC of Iloilo City. Summons was served on and received by petitioners on August 25, 1993, directing them to file an answer within the reglementary period of ten (10) days. Patricio Guevara was abroad at that time; hence, the MTCC did not acquire jurisdiction over him.
FACTS:
Private respondent was filed a complaint against petitioners for forcible entry in the MTCC of Iloilo City. Summons was served on and received by petitioners on August 25, 1993, directing them to file an answer within the reglementary period of ten (10) days. Patricio Guevara was abroad at that time; hence, the MTCC did not acquire jurisdiction over him.
On September 4, 1993, petitioners filed with the MTCC an urgent motion for extension of time to file an answer. On September 7, 1993, the MTCC denied the motion on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure. On September 8, 1993, or more than ten days from their receipt of the summons, petitioner submitted an urgent motion praying for the admission of their answer, which was attached thereto. Two days later, petitioners filed another motion pleading for the admission of an amended answer.
On September 23, 1993, the MTCC denied the motions and considered the case submitted for resolution. On October 27, 1993, the MTCC also denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, on November 26, 1993, the MTCC issued a decision resolving the complaint for forcible entry in favor of herein private respondents.
ISSUE:
May the Rule on Summary Procedure be interpreted liberally to allow the admission of an answer filed out of time due to alleged oversight?
HELD:
The Rule on Summary Procedure, in particular, was promulgated for the purpose of achieving an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases. For this reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and prohibits altogether the filing of motions for extension of time. Consistent with this reasoning is Section 6 of the Rule which allows the trial court to render judgment, even motu proprio, upon the failure of a defendant to file an answer within the reglementary period.
Indeed, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, mandating the promulgation of the Rule on Summary Procedure, authorizes the Court to stipulate that the period for filing pleadings in cases covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure shall be non-extendible.
Furthermore, speedy resolution of unlawful detainer cases is a matter of public policy,and this rule should equally apply with full force in forcible entry cases where the possession of the premises at the start is already illegal.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the use of the word shall in the Rule on Summary Procedure underscores the mandatory character of the challenged provisions. Giving the provisions a directory application would subvert the nature of the Rule on Summary Procedure and defeat its objective of expediting the adjudication of suits. Indeed, to admit a late answer, as petitioners suggest, is to put premium on dilatory maneuvers -- the very mischief that the Rule seeks to redress. In this light, petitioners invocation of the general principle in Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court is misplaced.
ISSUE:
May the Rule on Summary Procedure be interpreted liberally to allow the admission of an answer filed out of time due to alleged oversight?
HELD:
The Rule on Summary Procedure, in particular, was promulgated for the purpose of achieving an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases. For this reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and prohibits altogether the filing of motions for extension of time. Consistent with this reasoning is Section 6 of the Rule which allows the trial court to render judgment, even motu proprio, upon the failure of a defendant to file an answer within the reglementary period.
Indeed, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, mandating the promulgation of the Rule on Summary Procedure, authorizes the Court to stipulate that the period for filing pleadings in cases covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure shall be non-extendible.
Furthermore, speedy resolution of unlawful detainer cases is a matter of public policy,and this rule should equally apply with full force in forcible entry cases where the possession of the premises at the start is already illegal.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the use of the word shall in the Rule on Summary Procedure underscores the mandatory character of the challenged provisions. Giving the provisions a directory application would subvert the nature of the Rule on Summary Procedure and defeat its objective of expediting the adjudication of suits. Indeed, to admit a late answer, as petitioners suggest, is to put premium on dilatory maneuvers -- the very mischief that the Rule seeks to redress. In this light, petitioners invocation of the general principle in Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court is misplaced.
