Posted by: Eileen Shiella A. Dialimas on July 30, 2018
FACTS:
Petitioner EYIS is a domestic corporation engaged in the production, distribution and sale of air compressors and other industrial tools and equipment, while Respondent Shen Dar is a Taiwan-based foreign corporation engaged in the manufacture of air compressors. Both companies claimed to have the right to register the trademark "VESPA" for air compressors. EYIS imported air compressors from Shen Dar through sales contracts, wherein Shen Dar would supply EYIS containers worth of air compressors. The items were described merely as air compressors and there was no documentary evidence to show that such air compressors were marked VESPA. On June 9, 1997, Shen Dar filed Trademark Application with the IPO for the mark VESPA, Chinese Characters and Device for use on air compressors and welding machines while EYIS filed Trademark Application, also for the mark VESPA, for use on air compressors on July 28, 1999. In 2004, IPO issued COR in favor of EYIS. Thereafter, in 2007 Shen Dar was also issued COR. In the meantime, in 2004, Shen Dar filed a Petition for Cancellation of EYIS' COR with the BLA, on the ground of violation of IP Code, having first filed an application for the mark. BLA decided in favor of EYIS, which was upheld by the IPO Director General. On appeal, CA reversed the IPO Director General. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Supreme Court may review questions of fact.
RULING:
Petitioners raise the factual issue of who the true owner of the mark is. As a general rule, this Court is not a trier of facts. However, such rule is subject to exceptions.
In New City Builders, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court ruled that:
We are very much aware that the rule to the effect that this Court is not a trier of facts admits of exceptions. As we have stated in Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. CA:
It is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. However, the Court had recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of facts are conflicting;
(6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court;
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
(10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and
(11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
In the instant case, the records will show that the IPO and the CA made differing conclusions on the issue of ownership based on the evidence presented by the parties. Hence, this issue may be the subject of this Court's review.
FACTS:
Petitioner EYIS is a domestic corporation engaged in the production, distribution and sale of air compressors and other industrial tools and equipment, while Respondent Shen Dar is a Taiwan-based foreign corporation engaged in the manufacture of air compressors. Both companies claimed to have the right to register the trademark "VESPA" for air compressors. EYIS imported air compressors from Shen Dar through sales contracts, wherein Shen Dar would supply EYIS containers worth of air compressors. The items were described merely as air compressors and there was no documentary evidence to show that such air compressors were marked VESPA. On June 9, 1997, Shen Dar filed Trademark Application with the IPO for the mark VESPA, Chinese Characters and Device for use on air compressors and welding machines while EYIS filed Trademark Application, also for the mark VESPA, for use on air compressors on July 28, 1999. In 2004, IPO issued COR in favor of EYIS. Thereafter, in 2007 Shen Dar was also issued COR. In the meantime, in 2004, Shen Dar filed a Petition for Cancellation of EYIS' COR with the BLA, on the ground of violation of IP Code, having first filed an application for the mark. BLA decided in favor of EYIS, which was upheld by the IPO Director General. On appeal, CA reversed the IPO Director General. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Supreme Court may review questions of fact.
RULING:
Petitioners raise the factual issue of who the true owner of the mark is. As a general rule, this Court is not a trier of facts. However, such rule is subject to exceptions.
In New City Builders, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court ruled that:
We are very much aware that the rule to the effect that this Court is not a trier of facts admits of exceptions. As we have stated in Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. CA:
It is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. However, the Court had recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of facts are conflicting;
(6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court;
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
(10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and
(11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
In the instant case, the records will show that the IPO and the CA made differing conclusions on the issue of ownership based on the evidence presented by the parties. Hence, this issue may be the subject of this Court's review.
