Posted by: Jan Placido III on July 26, 2018
FACTS:
FACTS:
On December 15, 1986, petitioners filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title, Damages and Attorney's Fees before theKalibo, Aklan RTC, involving four (4) adjoining lots for a total land area of 14,771 sqm, located in Boracay Island,Malay, Aklan. The Trial Court declared intervenors Jesus delos Santos and Rosita delos Santos-Flores as lawful owners of two-thirds (2/3) of the disputed land, and Fred and Joan Elizalde as owners of the remaining one-third (1/3) of the land.
Several times the petitioners asked for extension to of time to file brief, to sum up it had a total extension of one hundred eighty (180) days from July 27, 1998, when they filed a motion for extension before the CA for the first time. In the meantime, respondents Fred Elizalde, Jesus delos Santos, and Rosita delos Santos-Flores filed an October 6,1998 Joint Manifestation and Motion, whereby respondent Elizalde abandoned his appeal by virtue of an amicable settlement between the parties through the May 27, 1997 Agreement. In addition, Elizalde moved that his appeal be considered as withdrawn and that he be excused from filing an appellant's brief. Respondents delos Santos opposed the foregoing motions for extension and moved for the dismissal of the appeal for petitioners' failure to file the required appellants' brief. However, on April 8, 1999, petitioners, through their former counsel Atty. Napoleon M. Victoriano, filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw Appeal. Petitioners would later on claim that they did not authorize Atty. Victoriano to withdraw their appeal. On May 11, 1999, the CA issued the assailed Decision dismissing CA-G.R. CV No. 54136 and SP No. 48475 and considering them withdrawn.
ISSUE:
Several times the petitioners asked for extension to of time to file brief, to sum up it had a total extension of one hundred eighty (180) days from July 27, 1998, when they filed a motion for extension before the CA for the first time. In the meantime, respondents Fred Elizalde, Jesus delos Santos, and Rosita delos Santos-Flores filed an October 6,1998 Joint Manifestation and Motion, whereby respondent Elizalde abandoned his appeal by virtue of an amicable settlement between the parties through the May 27, 1997 Agreement. In addition, Elizalde moved that his appeal be considered as withdrawn and that he be excused from filing an appellant's brief. Respondents delos Santos opposed the foregoing motions for extension and moved for the dismissal of the appeal for petitioners' failure to file the required appellants' brief. However, on April 8, 1999, petitioners, through their former counsel Atty. Napoleon M. Victoriano, filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw Appeal. Petitioners would later on claim that they did not authorize Atty. Victoriano to withdraw their appeal. On May 11, 1999, the CA issued the assailed Decision dismissing CA-G.R. CV No. 54136 and SP No. 48475 and considering them withdrawn.
ISSUE:
WON, petitioners claim that the Undertaking or Agreement allegedly entered into by them and respondents delos Santos is invalid considering that their purported signatures in it were forged.
HELD:
HELD:
There is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.[41] This is distinguished from a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants.
Furthermore, in Sampayan v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled, thus:
[S]ettled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally embark on a re-examination of the evidence adduced by the parties during trial. Of course, the rule admits of exceptions. So it is that in Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. CA, we wrote:
[i]t is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties' during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. However, the Court had recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[42]
A perusal of the exceptions enumerated above reveals that the instant case does not fall under any of them. Thus, this Court cannot entertain the factual issues raised in the petition, which include the issue of authenticity of the Undertaking or Agreement, as well as the issue of non-payment of the amount mentioned, particularly, in the Undertaking.
Furthermore, in Sampayan v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled, thus:
[S]ettled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally embark on a re-examination of the evidence adduced by the parties during trial. Of course, the rule admits of exceptions. So it is that in Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. CA, we wrote:
[i]t is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties' during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. However, the Court had recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[42]
A perusal of the exceptions enumerated above reveals that the instant case does not fall under any of them. Thus, this Court cannot entertain the factual issues raised in the petition, which include the issue of authenticity of the Undertaking or Agreement, as well as the issue of non-payment of the amount mentioned, particularly, in the Undertaking.
