Posted by: Pearlie Jane Q. Binahon
FACTS:
Petitioners are co-owners of a party, together with Maxima de Jesus and Salvador Barrios. Maxima was made the administrator of the property where Shell Company is a lessee. In their contract, 10% of the rentals is deducted by Maxima to the total payment of rent for her administration fee.
Shell, the lessee, pays its rent to Maxima, and Maxima delivers the respective shares of her co-owners thereafter.
Petitioners then sought to deprive Maxima of her 10% compensation by instructing Shell to pay directly to them instead of Maxima.
Respondent judge issued an ex-parte, a writ of preliminary injunction ordering Shell to pay Maxima the monthly rentals, and Maxima shall retain her 10% compensation and distribute the respective shares of her co-owners.
The question of jurisdiction is raised thereafter. Hence, this original action of certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners.
ISSUES:
I.
Whether or not the City Court of Manila has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
II.
Whether or not City Court of Manila has the power to issue a writ of preliminary or final injunction.
HELD:
I.
No. As starting point, we have the rule-long in standing and frequent in application that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or law. It cannot be fixed by the will of the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the parties. Neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court.
A rule, the validity of which is recognized, is that jurisdiction of an inferior court will not be presumed; it must appear clearly from statute or it will not be held to exist.
Jurisprudence teaches that the averments of the complaint, taken as a whole, are what determine the nature of the action, and therefore, the court's jurisdiction.
In plain language, Maxima asks of the court to compel two sets of defendants to toe the line: Shell to continue with the previous manner of payment (forma de pago) of rentals by means of a check drawn in her favor alone; and the dissenting co-owners to pay her the 10% of the rentals as compensation to which she claims she is entitled as administratrix of the property per agreement.
A careful and considerate examination of the complaint as a whole brings to the fore the fact that plaintiff Maxima de Jesus asks that these defendants comply faithfully with their respective commitments. It is in the context just recited that plaintiff's action below comes within the concept of specific performance of contract. And in this posture, we express the view that jurisdiction resides in the court of first instance. For, specific performance the subject of the litigation "is not capable of pecuniary estimation".
No. The law does not grant the city courts power to take cognizance of a case for final injunction. On the contrary, such authority is expressly granted by statute to courts of first instance in the exercise of their original jurisdiction. And the city court is without jurisdiction to hear and determine the case for final injunction against Shell.
The strong point on which respondents herein root their argument is Section 2 of Rule 58, which reads:
SEC. 2. Who may grant preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction may be granted by the judge of any court in which the action is pending, or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals or of the Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance in any action pending in an inferior court within his district.
They place the accent on the phrase "any court in which the action is pending." Argue respondents: Since the case is pending in the city court, it has jurisdiction to issue preliminary injunction. This ratiocination suffers from infirmities. First, we have ruled that the city court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; in consequence, it is powerless to grant an ancillary remedy therein. Second, the first sentence of Section 2 should be read in context. The last sentence of the quoted statute, namely, that injunction "may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance in any action pending in an inferior court within his district", emphasizes the point that the city court, except in the cases where it is specifically authorized by statute, cannot grant preliminary injunction. Third, as adverted to elsewhere in this opinion, absent an explicit and precise grant of jurisdiction in the city court, no amount of expensive construction would give such court that jurisdiction.
A rule, the validity of which is recognized, is that jurisdiction of an inferior court will not be presumed; it must appear clearly from statute or it will not be held to exist.
Jurisprudence teaches that the averments of the complaint, taken as a whole, are what determine the nature of the action, and therefore, the court's jurisdiction.
In plain language, Maxima asks of the court to compel two sets of defendants to toe the line: Shell to continue with the previous manner of payment (forma de pago) of rentals by means of a check drawn in her favor alone; and the dissenting co-owners to pay her the 10% of the rentals as compensation to which she claims she is entitled as administratrix of the property per agreement.
A careful and considerate examination of the complaint as a whole brings to the fore the fact that plaintiff Maxima de Jesus asks that these defendants comply faithfully with their respective commitments. It is in the context just recited that plaintiff's action below comes within the concept of specific performance of contract. And in this posture, we express the view that jurisdiction resides in the court of first instance. For, specific performance the subject of the litigation "is not capable of pecuniary estimation".
II.
No. The law does not grant the city courts power to take cognizance of a case for final injunction. On the contrary, such authority is expressly granted by statute to courts of first instance in the exercise of their original jurisdiction. And the city court is without jurisdiction to hear and determine the case for final injunction against Shell.
The strong point on which respondents herein root their argument is Section 2 of Rule 58, which reads:
SEC. 2. Who may grant preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction may be granted by the judge of any court in which the action is pending, or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals or of the Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance in any action pending in an inferior court within his district.
They place the accent on the phrase "any court in which the action is pending." Argue respondents: Since the case is pending in the city court, it has jurisdiction to issue preliminary injunction. This ratiocination suffers from infirmities. First, we have ruled that the city court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; in consequence, it is powerless to grant an ancillary remedy therein. Second, the first sentence of Section 2 should be read in context. The last sentence of the quoted statute, namely, that injunction "may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance in any action pending in an inferior court within his district", emphasizes the point that the city court, except in the cases where it is specifically authorized by statute, cannot grant preliminary injunction. Third, as adverted to elsewhere in this opinion, absent an explicit and precise grant of jurisdiction in the city court, no amount of expensive construction would give such court that jurisdiction.
