Posted by: Riyani Marie M. Nartea on July 26, 2018
FACTS
On October 14, 1998, through Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo (Remollo), the City of Dumaguete, filed before the RTC an Application for Original Registration of Title over a parcel of land with improvements, located at Barangay Looc, City of Dumaguete (subject property), under the Property Registration Decree.
The City of Dumaguete alleged in support of its application that the applicant, City of Dumaguete through its Honorable Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo, is the owner of the land subject of this application with all improvements and buildings comprising the Engineer's Compound where it is now situated that the land was acquired by possessory title in open, continuous, adverse occupation and possession in the concept of owner for more than thirty years since 1960.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, and Philippine Ports Authority(PPA), represented by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, filed separate Oppositions to the application for registration of the City of Dumaguete. Both the Republic and PPA averred that the City of Dumaguete may not register the subject property in its name since it had never been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said property for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and the subject property remains to be a portion of the public domain which belongs to the Republic.
PPA filed a Motion to Dismiss, seeking the dismissal of Land Registration Case on the ground that the RTC lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. PPA argued that Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, refers only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership. The subject property in LRC Case No. N-201 is not alienable and disposable, since it is a foreshore land, as explicitly testified to by City of Dumaguete's own witness, Engr. Dorado. A foreshore land is not registerable.
The RTC decreed in the end that "the instant application for original registration is dismissed for lack of merit."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of the RTC on the basis of lack of jurisdiction valid?
HELD:
No.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, created the RTC35 in place of the CFI. Presently, jurisdiction over an application for land registration remains with the RTC where the land is situated, except when such jurisdiction is delegated by the Supreme Court to the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts under certain circumstances.36
It is not disputed that the Application for Original Registration of Title filed by petitioner before the RTC of the City of Dumaguete conformed to Section 15 of the Property Registration Decree, which prescribes the form and contents of such applications. In its Application, petitioner prayed that its title to the subject property, which it repeatedly alleged to have acquired through continuous and adverse possession and occupation of the said property for more than 30 years or since 1960, be placed under the land registration laws. The allegations and prayer in the Application of petitioner were sufficient to vest jurisdiction on the RTC over the said Application upon the filing thereof.
Respondent sought the dismissal of LRC Case No. N-201 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, not because of the insufficiency of the allegations and prayer therein, but because the evidence presented by petitioner itself during the trial supposedly showed that the subject property is a foreshore land, which is not alienable and disposable. The RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss of respondent in its Order dated September 7, 2000. The RTC went beyond the allegations and prayer for relief in the Application for Original Registration of petitioner, and already scrutinized and weighed the testimony of Engr. Dorado, the only witness petitioner was able to present.
As to whether or not the subject property is indeed foreshore land is a factual issue which the RTC should resolve in the exercise of its jurisdiction, after giving both parties the opportunity to present their respective evidence at a full-blown trial.
FACTS
On October 14, 1998, through Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo (Remollo), the City of Dumaguete, filed before the RTC an Application for Original Registration of Title over a parcel of land with improvements, located at Barangay Looc, City of Dumaguete (subject property), under the Property Registration Decree.
The City of Dumaguete alleged in support of its application that the applicant, City of Dumaguete through its Honorable Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo, is the owner of the land subject of this application with all improvements and buildings comprising the Engineer's Compound where it is now situated that the land was acquired by possessory title in open, continuous, adverse occupation and possession in the concept of owner for more than thirty years since 1960.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, and Philippine Ports Authority(PPA), represented by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, filed separate Oppositions to the application for registration of the City of Dumaguete. Both the Republic and PPA averred that the City of Dumaguete may not register the subject property in its name since it had never been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said property for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and the subject property remains to be a portion of the public domain which belongs to the Republic.
PPA filed a Motion to Dismiss, seeking the dismissal of Land Registration Case on the ground that the RTC lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. PPA argued that Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, refers only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership. The subject property in LRC Case No. N-201 is not alienable and disposable, since it is a foreshore land, as explicitly testified to by City of Dumaguete's own witness, Engr. Dorado. A foreshore land is not registerable.
The RTC decreed in the end that "the instant application for original registration is dismissed for lack of merit."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of the RTC on the basis of lack of jurisdiction valid?
HELD:
No.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, created the RTC35 in place of the CFI. Presently, jurisdiction over an application for land registration remains with the RTC where the land is situated, except when such jurisdiction is delegated by the Supreme Court to the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts under certain circumstances.36
It is not disputed that the Application for Original Registration of Title filed by petitioner before the RTC of the City of Dumaguete conformed to Section 15 of the Property Registration Decree, which prescribes the form and contents of such applications. In its Application, petitioner prayed that its title to the subject property, which it repeatedly alleged to have acquired through continuous and adverse possession and occupation of the said property for more than 30 years or since 1960, be placed under the land registration laws. The allegations and prayer in the Application of petitioner were sufficient to vest jurisdiction on the RTC over the said Application upon the filing thereof.
Respondent sought the dismissal of LRC Case No. N-201 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, not because of the insufficiency of the allegations and prayer therein, but because the evidence presented by petitioner itself during the trial supposedly showed that the subject property is a foreshore land, which is not alienable and disposable. The RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss of respondent in its Order dated September 7, 2000. The RTC went beyond the allegations and prayer for relief in the Application for Original Registration of petitioner, and already scrutinized and weighed the testimony of Engr. Dorado, the only witness petitioner was able to present.
As to whether or not the subject property is indeed foreshore land is a factual issue which the RTC should resolve in the exercise of its jurisdiction, after giving both parties the opportunity to present their respective evidence at a full-blown trial.
