By: Maymay D. Tocalo, August 16, 2018
FACTS:
Bayog LANDOWNER-LESSOR and Magdato TENANT-LESSEE entered into an Agricultural Leasehold Contract over a lot located in Antique. President Marcos, pursuant to P.D. No. 27, R.A. No. 3844, and P.D. No. 1425, issued a Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold to Magdato, declaring that the latter had complied with all the requirements to become the agricultural lessee of the land cultivated by him and owned by Bayog.
Bayog executed a Deed of Equitable Mortgage in favor of Pesayco. Bayog asked Magdato to remove his house from his land. Magdato did not comply, Bayog and Pesayco, Jr. filed with the MCTC of Antique, a complaint, dated 26 November 1992, for "Ejectment and/or Abatement of Nuisance with Prayer for Demolition,".
MCTC declared that the case fell under the Rule on Summary Procedure and directed the issuance of summons which, together with complaint, was served on Magdato on 11 January 1993.
Magdato had then ten days from service of summons (or until 22 January 1993) to file his Answer but he filed it only on 25 January 1993. On 20 September 1993, the MCTC issued an Order holding that since Magdato's Answer was filed outside the reglementary period, it could not take cognizance thereof without exceeding its jurisdiction under Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129.It then considered "needless" for the court to resolve all pleadings subsequently filed, such as the answer; and then claiming authority under Section 5 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, the MCTC rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs Bayog and Pesayco.
Magdato filed a petition for relief from judgment with injunction and prayer to litigate as a pauper with the RTC. Magdato alleged therein that the late filing of his answer was due to mistake or excusable neglect, for at the time he received summons, he was stricken with pulmonary tuberculosis which restricted his mobility and sound judgment.
Judgment rendered by Judge Rosario of the MCTC is set aside and let this case be remanded back to that court for proper disposal.
Hence, Bayog and Pesayco filed this petition for certiorari and ask us to set aside the above order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for relief from judgment is prohibited under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
HELD:
We disagree with the RTC's holding that a petition for relief from judgment (Civil Case No. 2708) is not prohibited under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, in light of the Jakihaca ruling. When Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure bars a petition for relief from judgment of a petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court, it has in mind no other than Section 1, Rule 38 regarding petitions for relief from judgment, and Rule 65 regarding petitions for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition, of the Rules of Court, respectively. These petitions are cognizable by Regional Trial Courts, and not by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. If Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and Rules 38 and 65 of the Rules of Court are juxtaposed, the conclusion is inevitable that no petition for relief from judgment nor a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus arising from cases covered by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure may be filed with a superior court. This is but consistent with the mandate of Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129 to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases subject of summary procedure.
FACTS:
Bayog LANDOWNER-LESSOR and Magdato TENANT-LESSEE entered into an Agricultural Leasehold Contract over a lot located in Antique. President Marcos, pursuant to P.D. No. 27, R.A. No. 3844, and P.D. No. 1425, issued a Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold to Magdato, declaring that the latter had complied with all the requirements to become the agricultural lessee of the land cultivated by him and owned by Bayog.
Bayog executed a Deed of Equitable Mortgage in favor of Pesayco. Bayog asked Magdato to remove his house from his land. Magdato did not comply, Bayog and Pesayco, Jr. filed with the MCTC of Antique, a complaint, dated 26 November 1992, for "Ejectment and/or Abatement of Nuisance with Prayer for Demolition,".
MCTC declared that the case fell under the Rule on Summary Procedure and directed the issuance of summons which, together with complaint, was served on Magdato on 11 January 1993.
Magdato had then ten days from service of summons (or until 22 January 1993) to file his Answer but he filed it only on 25 January 1993. On 20 September 1993, the MCTC issued an Order holding that since Magdato's Answer was filed outside the reglementary period, it could not take cognizance thereof without exceeding its jurisdiction under Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129.It then considered "needless" for the court to resolve all pleadings subsequently filed, such as the answer; and then claiming authority under Section 5 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, the MCTC rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs Bayog and Pesayco.
Magdato filed a petition for relief from judgment with injunction and prayer to litigate as a pauper with the RTC. Magdato alleged therein that the late filing of his answer was due to mistake or excusable neglect, for at the time he received summons, he was stricken with pulmonary tuberculosis which restricted his mobility and sound judgment.
Judgment rendered by Judge Rosario of the MCTC is set aside and let this case be remanded back to that court for proper disposal.
Hence, Bayog and Pesayco filed this petition for certiorari and ask us to set aside the above order.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for relief from judgment is prohibited under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
HELD:
We disagree with the RTC's holding that a petition for relief from judgment (Civil Case No. 2708) is not prohibited under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, in light of the Jakihaca ruling. When Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure bars a petition for relief from judgment of a petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court, it has in mind no other than Section 1, Rule 38 regarding petitions for relief from judgment, and Rule 65 regarding petitions for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition, of the Rules of Court, respectively. These petitions are cognizable by Regional Trial Courts, and not by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. If Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and Rules 38 and 65 of the Rules of Court are juxtaposed, the conclusion is inevitable that no petition for relief from judgment nor a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus arising from cases covered by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure may be filed with a superior court. This is but consistent with the mandate of Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129 to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases subject of summary procedure.
