Posted by: Pearlie Jane Q. Binahon on July 19, 2018
FACTS:
The respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of eleven male persons, bandied as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang.
The Court held therein that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure could be given retroactive effect, there is still a need to determine whether the requirements for its application are attendant. It emphasized that the new rule fixes a time-bar to penalize the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in court.
In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners contend that (a) Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689; and (b) the time-bar in said rule should not be applied retroactively. The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 because the essential requirements for its application were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his resolution of March 29, 1999.
The petitioners contend that even on the assumption that the respondent expressly consented to a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 and all the heirs of the victims were notified of the respondent's motion before the hearing thereon and were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the eleven cases, the two-year bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be applied prospectively and not retroactively against the State. To apply the time limit retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent and his co-accused would violate the right of the People to due process, and unduly impair, reduce, and diminish the State's substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple murder.
For his part, the respondent asserts that the new rule under Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure may be applied retroactively since there is no substantive right of the State that may be impaired by its application to the criminal cases in question since 'the State's witnesses were ready, willing and able to provide their testimony but the prosecution failed to act on these cases until it became politically expedient in April 2001 for them to do so. 'According to the respondent, penal laws, either procedural or substantive, may be retroactively applied so long as they favor the accused. He asserts that the two-year period commenced to run on March 29, 1999 and lapsed two years thereafter was more than reasonable opportunity for the State to fairly indict him. In any event, the State is given the right under the Court's assailed Resolution to justify the filing of the Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 beyond the time-bar under the new rule.
Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court designed to enhance and implement the constitutional rights of parties in criminal proceedings may be applied retroactively or prospectively depending upon several factors, such as the history of the new rule, its purpose and effect, and whether the retrospective application will further its operation, the particular conduct sought to be remedied and the effect thereon in the administration of justice and of criminal laws in particular.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689.
Whether or not the time-bar in said rule be applied prospectively or retroactively.
RULING:
No. Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads: A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party. The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent 1 year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent 2 years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the Court of Appeals, the respondent is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely: (1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; (2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; (3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; (4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case. In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. For his part, the respondent merely filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of prosecution witnesses alleging that under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and the decision of this Court in Allado v. Diokno, among other cases, there was a need for the trial court to conduct a personal determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against respondent and to have the prosecutions witnesses summoned before the court for its examination. The respondents' admissions made in the course of the proceedings in the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive on him. The respondent is barred from repudiating his admissions absent evidence of palpable mistake in making such admissions. To apply the new rule in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 would be to add to or make exceptions from the new rule which are not expressly or impliedly included therein. Therefore, the State is not barred by the time limit set forth in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State can thus revive or refile Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or file new informations for multiple murder against the respondent.
Time-bar should not be applied retroactively. Though procedural rules may be applied retroactively, it should not be if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process. Statutes should be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils to be remedied. This is because to do so would be prejudicial to the State since, given that the Judge dismissed the case on March 29,1999, and the New rule took effect on Dec 1,2000, it would only in effect give them 1 year and three months to work instead of 2 years.
At that time, they had no knowledge of the said rule and therefore they should not be penalized for that. "Indeed for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone." The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused. To do so would cause an injustice of hardship to the state and adversely affect the administration of justice. To require the State to give a valid justification as a condition sine qua non to the revival of a case provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused before the effective date of the new rule is to assume that the State is obliged to comply with the time-bar under the new rule before it took effect. This would be a rank denial of justice. The State must be given a period of one year or two years as the case may be from December 1, 2000 to revive the criminal case without requiring the State to make a valid justification for not reviving the case before the effective date of the new rule. Although in criminal cases, the accused is entitled to justice and fairness, so is the State.
FACTS:
The respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of eleven male persons, bandied as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang.
The Court held therein that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure could be given retroactive effect, there is still a need to determine whether the requirements for its application are attendant. It emphasized that the new rule fixes a time-bar to penalize the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in court.
In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners contend that (a) Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689; and (b) the time-bar in said rule should not be applied retroactively. The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 because the essential requirements for its application were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his resolution of March 29, 1999.
The petitioners contend that even on the assumption that the respondent expressly consented to a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 and all the heirs of the victims were notified of the respondent's motion before the hearing thereon and were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the eleven cases, the two-year bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be applied prospectively and not retroactively against the State. To apply the time limit retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent and his co-accused would violate the right of the People to due process, and unduly impair, reduce, and diminish the State's substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple murder.
For his part, the respondent asserts that the new rule under Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure may be applied retroactively since there is no substantive right of the State that may be impaired by its application to the criminal cases in question since 'the State's witnesses were ready, willing and able to provide their testimony but the prosecution failed to act on these cases until it became politically expedient in April 2001 for them to do so. 'According to the respondent, penal laws, either procedural or substantive, may be retroactively applied so long as they favor the accused. He asserts that the two-year period commenced to run on March 29, 1999 and lapsed two years thereafter was more than reasonable opportunity for the State to fairly indict him. In any event, the State is given the right under the Court's assailed Resolution to justify the filing of the Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 beyond the time-bar under the new rule.
Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court designed to enhance and implement the constitutional rights of parties in criminal proceedings may be applied retroactively or prospectively depending upon several factors, such as the history of the new rule, its purpose and effect, and whether the retrospective application will further its operation, the particular conduct sought to be remedied and the effect thereon in the administration of justice and of criminal laws in particular.
ISSUES:
I.
Whether or not Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689.
II.
Whether or not the time-bar in said rule be applied prospectively or retroactively.
RULING:
I.
No. Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads: A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party. The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent 1 year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent 2 years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the Court of Appeals, the respondent is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely: (1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; (2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; (3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; (4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case. In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. For his part, the respondent merely filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of prosecution witnesses alleging that under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and the decision of this Court in Allado v. Diokno, among other cases, there was a need for the trial court to conduct a personal determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against respondent and to have the prosecutions witnesses summoned before the court for its examination. The respondents' admissions made in the course of the proceedings in the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive on him. The respondent is barred from repudiating his admissions absent evidence of palpable mistake in making such admissions. To apply the new rule in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 would be to add to or make exceptions from the new rule which are not expressly or impliedly included therein. Therefore, the State is not barred by the time limit set forth in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State can thus revive or refile Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or file new informations for multiple murder against the respondent.
II.
Time-bar should not be applied retroactively. Though procedural rules may be applied retroactively, it should not be if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process. Statutes should be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils to be remedied. This is because to do so would be prejudicial to the State since, given that the Judge dismissed the case on March 29,1999, and the New rule took effect on Dec 1,2000, it would only in effect give them 1 year and three months to work instead of 2 years.
At that time, they had no knowledge of the said rule and therefore they should not be penalized for that. "Indeed for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone." The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused. To do so would cause an injustice of hardship to the state and adversely affect the administration of justice. To require the State to give a valid justification as a condition sine qua non to the revival of a case provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused before the effective date of the new rule is to assume that the State is obliged to comply with the time-bar under the new rule before it took effect. This would be a rank denial of justice. The State must be given a period of one year or two years as the case may be from December 1, 2000 to revive the criminal case without requiring the State to make a valid justification for not reviving the case before the effective date of the new rule. Although in criminal cases, the accused is entitled to justice and fairness, so is the State.
