Milagros Panuncillo worked as an Office Senior Clerk of CAP Philippines Inc. (CAP). Panuncillo procured an educational plan which she had fully paid but which she later sold to Josefina Pernes for P37,000. Before the actual transfer of the plan could be effected, however, Panuncillo pledged it for P50,000 to John Chua who, however, sold it to Benito Bonghanoy. Bonghanoy in turn sold the plan to Gaudioso R. Uy for P60,000. Because of the subsequent transactions, Josefina informed CAP that Panuncillo had "swindled" her but that she was willing to settle the case amicably as long as Panuncillo will pay the amount involved and the interest.
CAP Philippines Inc. terminated the services of Panuncillo. Panuncillo then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, damages and attorney's fees against CAP Philippines Inc.
The appellate court reversed the NLRC Decision and held that the dismissal was valid and that CAP Philippines Inc. complied with the procedural requirements of due process. Hence, the present petition.
The appellate court reversed the NLRC Decision and held that the dismissal was valid and that CAP Philippines Inc. complied with the procedural requirements of due process. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Milagros Panuncillo has been illegally dismissed?
HELD:
HELD:
No. In fine, by petitioner's repeated violation of Section 8.4 of respondent's Code of Discipline, she violated the trust and confidence of respondent and its customers. To allow her to continue with her employment puts respondent under the risk of being embroiled in unnecessary lawsuits from customers similarly situated as Josefina, et al. Clearly, respondent exercised its management prerogative when it dismissed petitioner.
. . . [T]ime and again, this Court has upheld a company's management prerogatives so long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements.
Petitioner nevertheless argues that she was not afforded due process before her dismissal as she was merely required to answer a show-cause memorandum dated April 7, 1999 and there was no actual investigation conducted in which she could have been heard.
. . . [T]ime and again, this Court has upheld a company's management prerogatives so long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements.
Petitioner nevertheless argues that she was not afforded due process before her dismissal as she was merely required to answer a show-cause memorandum dated April 7, 1999 and there was no actual investigation conducted in which she could have been heard.
Before terminating the services of an employee, the law requires two written notices: (1) one to apprise him of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the other to inform him of his employer's decision to dismiss him. As to the requirement of a hearing, the essence of due process lies in an opportunity to be heard, and not always and indispensably in an actual hearing.
There can thus be no doubt that petitioner was given ample opportunity to explain her side. Parenthetically, when an employee admits the acts complained of, as in petitioner's case, no formal hearing is even necessary.
There can thus be no doubt that petitioner was given ample opportunity to explain her side. Parenthetically, when an employee admits the acts complained of, as in petitioner's case, no formal hearing is even necessary.
