Posted by: Vincent Albien V. Arnado on 20 July 2018
FACTS:
On Dec 1907, Manila Railroad Co. began an action in CFI Tarlac for the condemnation of a certain real estate which measures up to 69,910 square meters in area located in Tarlac. This is for construction of a railroad line from Paniqui to Tayug in the province of Tarlac.
Before beginning the action, Manila Railroad had caused to be made a thorough search in the Office of the Registry of Property and of the Tax where the lands sought to be condemned were located and to whom they belonged. As a result of such investigations, it alleged that the lands in question were located in the province of Tarlac.
After filing and duly serving the complaint, the plaintiff, pending final determination of the action, took possession of and occupied the lands described in the complaint, building its line and putting the same in operation.
On Oct 4, Manila Railroad gave notice to the defendants that on Oct. 9, a motion would be made to the court to dismiss the action upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, it having just been ascertained by the plaintiff that the land sought to be condemned was situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija, instead of the Province of Tarlac, as alleged in the complaint. This motion was heard and, after due consideration, the trial court dismissed the action upon the ground presented by the plaintiff.
Whether or not the CFI of Tarlac has power and authority to take cognizance of an action by the railroad company for the condemnation of real estate located in another province.
Whether or not Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Act. No. 1258 are applicable and so the CFI has no jurisdiction over the case.
As to the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled in affirmative, Sections 55 and 56 of Act No. 136 of the Philippine Commission confer perfect and complete jurisdiction upon the CFI of these Islands with respect to real estate. Such jurisdiction is not made to depend upon locality. There is no suggestion of limitation. The jurisdiction is universal. It is nowhere suggested, much less provided, that a Court of First Instance of one province, regularly sitting in said province, may not under certain conditions take cognizance of an action arising in another province or of an action relating to real estate located outside of the boundaries of the province to which it may at the time be assigned
Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority; it simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not exercised in conformity with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter. It means simply that he may thereby lose jurisdiction of the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it.
As to the subject matter, nothing can change the jurisdiction of the court over diminish it or dictate when it shall attach or when it shall be removed. That is a matter of legislative enactment which none but the legislature may change. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the court over the person is, in some instances, made to defend on the consent or objection, on the acts or omissions of the parties or any of them. Jurisdiction over the person, however, may be conferred by consent, expressly or impliedly given, or it may, by an objection, be prevented from attaching or removed after it has attached.
As to the second issue, the Supreme Court rule in the negative, that section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to actions by railroad corporations to condemn lands; and that, while with the consent of defendants express or implied the venue may be laid and the action tried in any province selected by the plaintiff nevertheless the defendants whose lands lie in one province, or any one of such defendants, may, by timely application to the court, require the venue as to their, or, if one defendant, his, lands to be changed to the province where their or his lands lie. In such case the action as to all of the defendants not objecting would continue in the province where originally begun. It would be severed as to the objecting defendants and ordered continued before the court of the appropriate province or provinces. While we are of that opinion and so hold it cannot affect the decision in the case before us for the reason that the defendants are not objecting to the venue and are not asking for a change thereof. They have not only expressly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court but are here asking that that jurisdiction be maintained against the efforts of the plaintiff to remove it.
The question of venue as presented in the Acts mentioned does not relate to jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter, it simply granting to the defendant certain rights and privileges as against the plaintiff relative to the place of trial, which rights and privileges he might waive expressly or by implication.
For these reasons the Supreme Court reversed the judgement and the cause remanded to the trial court with the direction to proceed with the action in accordance with law.
Before beginning the action, Manila Railroad had caused to be made a thorough search in the Office of the Registry of Property and of the Tax where the lands sought to be condemned were located and to whom they belonged. As a result of such investigations, it alleged that the lands in question were located in the province of Tarlac.
After filing and duly serving the complaint, the plaintiff, pending final determination of the action, took possession of and occupied the lands described in the complaint, building its line and putting the same in operation.
On Oct 4, Manila Railroad gave notice to the defendants that on Oct. 9, a motion would be made to the court to dismiss the action upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, it having just been ascertained by the plaintiff that the land sought to be condemned was situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija, instead of the Province of Tarlac, as alleged in the complaint. This motion was heard and, after due consideration, the trial court dismissed the action upon the ground presented by the plaintiff.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the CFI of Tarlac has power and authority to take cognizance of an action by the railroad company for the condemnation of real estate located in another province.
Whether or not Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Act. No. 1258 are applicable and so the CFI has no jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
As to the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled in affirmative, Sections 55 and 56 of Act No. 136 of the Philippine Commission confer perfect and complete jurisdiction upon the CFI of these Islands with respect to real estate. Such jurisdiction is not made to depend upon locality. There is no suggestion of limitation. The jurisdiction is universal. It is nowhere suggested, much less provided, that a Court of First Instance of one province, regularly sitting in said province, may not under certain conditions take cognizance of an action arising in another province or of an action relating to real estate located outside of the boundaries of the province to which it may at the time be assigned
Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority; it simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not exercised in conformity with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter. It means simply that he may thereby lose jurisdiction of the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it.
As to the subject matter, nothing can change the jurisdiction of the court over diminish it or dictate when it shall attach or when it shall be removed. That is a matter of legislative enactment which none but the legislature may change. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the court over the person is, in some instances, made to defend on the consent or objection, on the acts or omissions of the parties or any of them. Jurisdiction over the person, however, may be conferred by consent, expressly or impliedly given, or it may, by an objection, be prevented from attaching or removed after it has attached.
As to the second issue, the Supreme Court rule in the negative, that section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to actions by railroad corporations to condemn lands; and that, while with the consent of defendants express or implied the venue may be laid and the action tried in any province selected by the plaintiff nevertheless the defendants whose lands lie in one province, or any one of such defendants, may, by timely application to the court, require the venue as to their, or, if one defendant, his, lands to be changed to the province where their or his lands lie. In such case the action as to all of the defendants not objecting would continue in the province where originally begun. It would be severed as to the objecting defendants and ordered continued before the court of the appropriate province or provinces. While we are of that opinion and so hold it cannot affect the decision in the case before us for the reason that the defendants are not objecting to the venue and are not asking for a change thereof. They have not only expressly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court but are here asking that that jurisdiction be maintained against the efforts of the plaintiff to remove it.
The question of venue as presented in the Acts mentioned does not relate to jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter, it simply granting to the defendant certain rights and privileges as against the plaintiff relative to the place of trial, which rights and privileges he might waive expressly or by implication.
For these reasons the Supreme Court reversed the judgement and the cause remanded to the trial court with the direction to proceed with the action in accordance with law.
