Posted by: Diana Calipes Islo on July 19, 2018
On January 22, 1981, Tan, for a consideration of P59,200 executed a deed of absolute sale over the property in question in favor of spouses Jose Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal. Simultaneous with the execution of this deed, the same contracting parties entered into another agreement whereunder Tan was given one (1) year within which to redeem or repurchase the property. Tan failed to redeem the property until his death on January 4, 1988.
On May 2, 1988, Tan's heirs filed before the RTC at Davao City a suit against the Magdangals for reformation of instrument alleging that while Tan and the Magdangals denominated their agreement as deed of absolute sale, their real intention was to conclude an equitable mortgage.
RTC rendered judgment finding for Tan, portion of which reads:
1) The Deed of Absolute Sale is, in accordance with the true intention of the parties, hereby declared and reformed an equitable mortgage;
2) The plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendants within 120 days after the finality of this decision P59,200 plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum from May 2, 1988, the date the complaint was filed, until paid;
3)xxx.
On Sept. 28, 1995, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Both parties received the decision of the appellate court on Oct. 5, 1995. On March 13, 1996, the clerk of court of the appellate court entered in the Book of Entries of Judgement the decision xxx and issued the corresponding Entry of Judgment which, on its face, stated that the said decision has on Oct. 21, 1995 become final and executory.
RTC rendered judgment finding for Tan, portion of which reads:
1) The Deed of Absolute Sale is, in accordance with the true intention of the parties, hereby declared and reformed an equitable mortgage;
2) The plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendants within 120 days after the finality of this decision P59,200 plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum from May 2, 1988, the date the complaint was filed, until paid;
3)xxx.
On Sept. 28, 1995, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Both parties received the decision of the appellate court on Oct. 5, 1995. On March 13, 1996, the clerk of court of the appellate court entered in the Book of Entries of Judgement the decision xxx and issued the corresponding Entry of Judgment which, on its face, stated that the said decision has on Oct. 21, 1995 become final and executory.
Magdangals filed in the RTC a Motion for Consolidation and Writ of Possession alleging that the 120-day period of redemption of the petitioner has expired.
On June 10, 1996, the RTC allowed the petitioner to redeem the lot in question. It ruled that the 120-day redemption period should be reckoned from the date of Entry of Judgment in the CA or from March 13, 1996. The redemption price was deposited on April 17, 1996.
ISSUE:
What rule should govern the finality of judgment favorably obtained in the trial court by the petitioner?
HELD:
From 1991-1996, the years relevant to the case at bar, the rule that governs finality of judgment is Rule 51 of the Revised Rules of Court. Its sections 10 and 11 provide:
SEC. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. If no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date when the judgments or final resolution becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final resolution and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or final resolution has become final and executory.
SEC.11. Execution of judgment. Except where the judgment or final order or resolution, or a portion thereof, is ordered to be immediately executory, the motion for its execution may only be filed in the proper court after its entry.
The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, amended the rule on finality of judgment by providing in section 1, Rule 39 as follows:
Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.
SC hold that section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not be given retroactive effect in this case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner. Undoubtedly, petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot and this right is a substantive right. Petitioner followed the procedural rule then existing as well as the decisions of this Court governing the reckoning date of the period of redemption when he redeemed the subject lot. Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure which if applied retroactively would result in his losing the right to redeem the subject lot. It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive application of this procedural rule with the rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be penalized with the loss of the subject lot when he faithfully followed the laws and the rule on the period of redemption when he made the redemption.
On June 10, 1996, the RTC allowed the petitioner to redeem the lot in question. It ruled that the 120-day redemption period should be reckoned from the date of Entry of Judgment in the CA or from March 13, 1996. The redemption price was deposited on April 17, 1996.
ISSUE:
What rule should govern the finality of judgment favorably obtained in the trial court by the petitioner?
HELD:
From 1991-1996, the years relevant to the case at bar, the rule that governs finality of judgment is Rule 51 of the Revised Rules of Court. Its sections 10 and 11 provide:
SEC. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. If no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date when the judgments or final resolution becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final resolution and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or final resolution has become final and executory.
SEC.11. Execution of judgment. Except where the judgment or final order or resolution, or a portion thereof, is ordered to be immediately executory, the motion for its execution may only be filed in the proper court after its entry.
The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, amended the rule on finality of judgment by providing in section 1, Rule 39 as follows:
Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.
SC hold that section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not be given retroactive effect in this case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner. Undoubtedly, petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot and this right is a substantive right. Petitioner followed the procedural rule then existing as well as the decisions of this Court governing the reckoning date of the period of redemption when he redeemed the subject lot. Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure which if applied retroactively would result in his losing the right to redeem the subject lot. It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive application of this procedural rule with the rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be penalized with the loss of the subject lot when he faithfully followed the laws and the rule on the period of redemption when he made the redemption.
