G.R. 226679, 15 Aug. 2017
FACTS:
Petitioner Salvador Estipona, Jr. was accused in Criminal Case No. 13586 for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, for having illegally have in his possession 0.084 gram of shabu. Under Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, plea-bargaining is prohibited in all drug cases.
On June 15, 2016, he filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and be allowed to enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 12 of R.A. No. 9165 (for Possession of Drug Paraphernalia).
The trial court denied his Motion holding that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 expressly prohibits plea-bargaining in drugs cases. Estipona filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the trial court.
Arguing that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165 is unconstitutional for it encroaches upon the Supreme Court's rule-making power and therefore violative of the equal protection clause, he filed a Petition before the SC to declare Sec. 23 unconstitutional.
The Solicitor General opposed the petition on the ground that (1) Congress was not impleaded, (2) the constitutionality of the law cannot be attached collaterally, (3) the proper action should have been a petition for relief before the RTC, and (4) the petition fails to satisfy the requisites for judicial review.
ISSUES:
1.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH PROHIBITS PLEA BARGAINING IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE SAID LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
II.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT ENCROACHED UPON THE POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES OF PROCEDURE.
III.
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DECLARE SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.10
HELD:
The SC ruled:
On Matters of Technicality:
On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe correct. Nonetheless, without much further ado, it must be underscored that it is within this Court's power to make exceptions to the rules of court. Under proper conditions, We may permit the full and exhaustive ventilation of the parties' arguments and positions despite the supposed technical infirmities of a petition or its alleged procedural flaws. In discharging its solemn duty as the final arbiter of constitutional issues, the Court shall not shirk from its obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications.
Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat when issues of substantial and transcendental importance are present. We have acknowledged that the Philippines' problem on illegal drugs has reached "epidemic," "monstrous," and "harrowing" proportions, and that its disastrously harmful social, economic, and spiritual effects have broken the lives, shattered the hopes, and destroyed the future of thousands especially our young citizens.
Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in this petition, technical matters should not deter Us from having to make the final and definitive pronouncement that everyone else depends for enlightenment and guidance. When public interest requires, the Court may brush aside procedural rules in order to resolve a constitutional issue.
On SC's Rule-Making Power:
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.
It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement.
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court.
The power of Congress (to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines under Sec. 13, Art, VIII of he 1935 Constitution), however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re: Cunanan, Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional.
The rule making power of this [1987] Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the .first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. x x x.
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure.x x x. The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court. Viewed from this perspective, We have rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules).
On Plea-Bargaining:
The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to the preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish, increase or modify the latter. "Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions." Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in nature.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.
Does Sec. 23, RA 9165 Violate the Equal Protection Clause?
At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt any future discussion by the Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165. Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, We deem it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.
