Period to Appeal Under the Rules of Court
The period to appeal is specifically governed by Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129),15 as amended, Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Section 39 of BP 129, as amended, provides:
SEC. 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from: Provided, however, That in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from.
Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. — An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion has been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run.
The “Fresh Period Rule”
However, in Neypes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005, the Court modified the rule in civil cases on the counting of the 15-day period within which to appeal. The Court categorically set a fresh period of 15 days from a denial of a motion for reconsideration within which to appeal, thus:
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
x x x x To recapitulate, a party-litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the final order) denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.”
x x x x To recapitulate, a party-litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the final order) denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.”
The Court also reiterated its ruling that it is the denial of the motion for reconsideration that constituted the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.
Raison d’être for the Fresh Period Rule
The raison d’être for the “fresh period rule” is to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution.
“Neypes Rule” Applicable in Criminal Cases
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court’s pronouncement of a “fresh period” to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:
First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that “[t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from.” Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to recognize any distinction.
Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the same. There is no substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are concerned – the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration. It was this situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed.
Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. — x x x x
First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that “[t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from.” Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to recognize any distinction.
Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the same. There is no substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are concerned – the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration. It was this situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed.
Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. — x x x x
(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.
“Neypes Rule” Applicable Only in Judicial Appeals
In Panolino v. Tajala,11 the Court was confronted with a similar issue of whether the "fresh period rule" applies to an appeal filed from the decision or order of the DENR regional office to the DENR Secretary, an appeal which is administrative in nature. We held in Panolino that the "fresh period rule" only covers judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
The "fresh period rule" in Neypes declares:
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals; and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
x x x x
As reflected in the above-quoted portion of the decision in Neypes, the "fresh period rule" shall apply to Rule 40_(appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts); Rule 41 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court); Rule 42 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals); Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals); and Rule 45 (appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court). Obviously, these Rules cover judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioner's present case is administrative in nature involving an appeal from the decision or order of the DENR regional office to the DENR Secretary. Such appeal is indeed governed by Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 87, Series of 1990. As earlier quoted, Section 1 clearly provides that if the motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall perfect his appeal "during the remainder of the period of appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial;" whereas if the decision is reversed, the adverse party has a fresh 15-day period to perfect his appeal. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the subject appeal, i.e., appeal from a decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the OP, is not judicial but administrative in nature; thus, the "fresh period rule" in Neypes does not apply.
As aptly pointed out by the OP, the rules and regulations governing appeals from decisions of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the OP are Section 2, Rule XXI of HLURB Resolution No. 765, series of 2004, in relation to Paragraph 2, Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987:
Section 2, Rule XXI of the HLURB Resolution No. 765, series of 2004, prescribing the rules and regulations governing appeals from decisions of the Board of Commissioners to the Office of the President, pertinently reads:
Section 2. Appeal. - Any party may, upon notice to the Board and the other party, appeal a decision rendered by the Board of Commissioners to the Office of the President within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, in accordance with P.D. No. 1344 and A.O. No. 18 Series of 1987.
The pendency of the motion for reconsideration shall suspend the running of the period of appeal to the Office of the President.
Corollary thereto, paragraph 2, Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987, provides that in case the aggrieved party files a motion for reconsideration from an adverse decision of any agency/office, the said party has the only remaining balance of the prescriptive period within which to appeal, reckoned from receipt of notice of the decision denying his/her motion for reconsideration.12 (Emphasis supplied.)
Not Applicable in Certiorari Cases
We ruled in Pates v. Commission on Elections that the belated filing of the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 on the belief that the fresh period rule should apply was fatal to the recourse. As such, the petitioner herein should suffer the same fate for having wrongly assumed that the fresh period rule under Neypes applied. Rules of procedure may be relaxed only to relieve a litigant of an injustice that is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure. Absent this reason for liberality, the petition cannot be allowed to prosper (Fortune Life Insurance vs. COA, G.R. No. 213525, January 27, 2015).
"Neypes Rule Not Application in DARAB Cases
In the present case, the appeal from a decision of the Provincial Adjudicator to the DARAB as provided for under Section 1, Rule XIV of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, is not judicial but administrative in nature. As such, the "fresh period rule" in Neypes finds no application therein. (Jocson vs. San Miguel, G.R. No. 206941, 09 Mar. 2016)
Not Applicable in Certiorari Cases
We ruled in Pates v. Commission on Elections that the belated filing of the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 on the belief that the fresh period rule should apply was fatal to the recourse. As such, the petitioner herein should suffer the same fate for having wrongly assumed that the fresh period rule under Neypes applied. Rules of procedure may be relaxed only to relieve a litigant of an injustice that is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure. Absent this reason for liberality, the petition cannot be allowed to prosper (Fortune Life Insurance vs. COA, G.R. No. 213525, January 27, 2015).
"Neypes Rule Not Application in DARAB Cases
In the present case, the appeal from a decision of the Provincial Adjudicator to the DARAB as provided for under Section 1, Rule XIV of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, is not judicial but administrative in nature. As such, the "fresh period rule" in Neypes finds no application therein. (Jocson vs. San Miguel, G.R. No. 206941, 09 Mar. 2016)
