Pre-Trial




Nature and Purpose of Pretrial

Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Although it was discretionary under the 1940 Rules of Court, it was made mandatory under the 1964 Rules and the subsequent amendments in 1997. Hailed as "the most important procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the nineteenth century, pre-trial seeks to achieve the following:

The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative modes of dispute resolution;

§  The simplification of the issues;
§  The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
§  The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to avoid unnecessary proof;
§  The limitation of the number of witnesses;
§  The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner;
§  The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist;
§  The advisability or necessity of suspending the proceedings; and
§  Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action. 

 
In light of these objectives, the parties are also required to submit a pre-trial brief, which must contain the following:


  • §  A statement of their willingness to enter into amicable settlement or alternative modes of dispute resolution, indicating the desired terms thereof;
  • §  A summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation of facts;
  • §  The issues to be tried or resolved;
  • §  The documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the purpose thereof;
  • §  A manifestation of their having availed or their intention to avail themselves of discovery procedures or referral to commissioners; and
  • §  The number and names of the witnesses, and the substance of their respective testimonies.   (Silvestre Tiu versus Daniel Middleton, G.R. No. 134998, 19 July 1999)



Pretrial is Mandatory


At the outset, the Court emphasizes that pre-trial and its governing rules are not technicalities which the parties may ignore or trifle with. As earlier stated, pre-trial is essential in the simplification and the speedy disposition of disputes.

Everyone knows that a pre-trial in civil actions is mandatory, and has been so since January 1, 1964. Yet to this day its placed in the scheme of things is not fully appreciated, and it receives but perfunctory treatment in many court. Some courts consider it a mere technicality, serving no useful purpose save perhaps, occasionally to furnish ground for non-suiting the plaintiff, or declaring a defendant in default, or, wistfully, to bring about a compromise. The pre-trial device is not thus put to full use. Hence it has failed in the main to accomplish the chief objective for it: the simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation. This is a great pity, because the objective is attainable, and with not much difficulty, if the device were more intelligently and extensively handled.

Pre-trial is an essential device for the speedy disposition of disputes. Hence, parties cannot brush it aside as a mere technicality. Where the pre-trial brief does not contain the names of witnesses and the synopses of their testimonies as required by the Rules of Court, the trial court, through its pre-trial order, may bar the witnesses from testifying. However, an order allowing the presentation of unnamed witnesses may no longer be modified during the trial without the consent of the parties affected. (Silvestre Tiu versus Daniel Middleton, G.R. No. 134998, 19 July 1999)

Duty to Promptly Move for Pretrial

After the last pleading has been served and filed, it shall be the duty of the plaintiff to promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pretrial. (R18:1).

The notice of pretrial shall be served on counsel, or on the party who has no counsel.  The counsel served with such notice is charged with the duty of notifying the party represented by him. (R18:3)


If no notice of pre-trial is served, all the proceedings at the pre-trial et seq. are null and void.13 Hence, the absence of the requisite notice of pre-trial to the defendant’s counsel (or to the defendant himself, in case he has no counsel) nullifies the order allowing the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte. (Rolando Agulto versus William Tecson, G.R. No. 145276, 29 Nov.2005)

Duty to Appear For and During Pretrial

It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The non-appearance of a party may be excused only if a valid cause is shown therefor or if a representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents. (R18:4)


Duty to File Pretrial Brief
  
The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, in such manner as shall ensure their receipt thereof at least three (3) days before the date of the pre-trial, their respective pre-trial briefs which shall contain, among others: 
  
A statement of their willingness to enter into amicable settlement or alternative modes of dispute resolution, indicating the desired terms thereof; 
A summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation of facts; 
The issues to be tried or resolved; 
The documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the purpose thereof; 
A manifestation of their having availed or their intention to avail themselves of discovery procedures or referral to commissioners; and 
The number and names of the witnesses, and the substance of their respective testimonies. (R18:6)

Effect of Failure to Appear for Pretrial

The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof. (R18:5)

Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial. (R18:6)

Consistently with the mandatory character of the pre-trial, the Rules oblige not only the lawyers but the parties as well to appear for this purpose before the Court, and when a party "fails to appear at a pre-trial conference (he) may be non-suited or considered as in default." The obligation "to appear" denotes not simply the personal appearance, or the mere physical presentation by a party of one’s self, but connotes as importantly, preparedness to go into the different subject assigned by law to a pre-trial. (Durban Apartments versus Pioneer Insurance, G.R. No. 179419, 12 Jan. 2011)

  Discretion to Declare Party as in Default Must be Resorted Sparingly

In a case (decided before the 1997 Rules), the Supreme Court had said that the power to declare a party as in default must be used sparingly, thus:


Rule 20, Sec. 2 of the [old]Rules of Court stipulates that "A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference may be non-suited or considered as in default." But the petitioners in the instant case did not fail to appear at the pre-trial conference on July 26, 1978, as ordered by the trial court. They were there. What they failed to do was to submit a pre-trial brief three days before the date which the Rules of Court do not require. In fact, the Court of Appeals correctly observed: "There is some merit to the claim that the petitioner was declared as in default somewhat hurriedly, just because he had failed to submit a pre-trial brief, three days before the scheduled date. Trial courts should use sparingly the power to declare a party as in default, because party thereby loses the right to offer evidence. (Atty. Reynaldo Dimayacyac versus CA, G.R. No. L-50907, 27 Sept. 1979)

[Note that under the old Rules, the court may declare a defendant "as in default" for failure to appear for Pretrial.  The new Rules now authorizes the court to declare such defendant "in default."]

Extrinsic Fraud Not Ground to Lift Order of Non-Suit


It bears stressing that when petitioner's counsel filed the Manifestation and Motion asking for reconsideration of the Order declaring the Spouses Arcenas non-suited, the reason stated was honest mistake or excusable negligence, xxx and that his failure to attend the hearings and to file a motion for reconsideration of the declaration of petitioner as non-suited was because of his mistaken belief that respondent bank was earnestly seeking a settlement. There was nothing in the Manifestation and Motion which alluded the commission of extrinsic fraud to respondent bank's counsel. xxx

Moreover, since petitioner claimed that there was extrinsic fraud committed by respondent bank's counsel, she could have filed a petition for relief under Rule 38 within the period provided for by the Rules of Court, but she did not. Section 2, Rule 47 clearly states that extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground for annulment of order if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. Thus, extrinsic fraud is effectively barred if it could have been raised as a ground in an available remedial measure.

Petitioner tries to justify her failure to avail of the appropriate remedies on a promise of settlement. However, such promise was not an excuse for petitioner's counsel not to lift the order of non-suit and to file a petition for relief. (Oscar Arcenas versus Queen City Development, G.R. No. 166819,               16 June 2010)


When Failure to Appear and File Pretrial Brief Excused


The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the trial court had "no discretion" on the matter of a party’s failure to file a pre-trial brief. If the trial court has discretion to dismiss the case because of plaintiff’s failure to appear at pre-trial,13 then the trial court also has discretion to dismiss the case because of plaintiff’s failure to file the pre-trial brief. Moreover, whether an order of dismissal should be maintained under the circumstances of a particular case or whether it should be set aside depends on the sound discretion of the trial court.14

In this case, petitioner sufficiently explained that the pre-trial brief was sent by registered mail to the trial court and respondent on 8 June 2001. That the trial court and respondent did not receive the pre-trial brief at least three days prior to the pre-trial was already beyond petitioner’s control. Therefore, the trial court had discretion to lift the order of dismissal after giving credence to petitioner’s explanation.




Moreover, in Calalang v. Court of Appeals,19 the Court ruled that "unless a party’s conduct is so negligent, irresponsible, contumacious, or dilatory as to provide substantial grounds for dismissal for non-appearance, the courts should consider lesser sanctions which would still amount into achieving the desired end." In this case, there is also no showing that petitioner willfully and flagrantly disregarded the trial court’s authority. There is also no indication that petitioner had manifested lack of interest to prosecute or acted deliberately with the intention to delay the proceedings. Therefore, the trial court acted accordingly when it set aside the order of dismissal and ordered the reinstatement of petitioner’s complaint.

We are not saying that adherence to the Rules could be dispensed with. However, exigencies and situations might occasionally demand flexibility in their application.20 In this instance, substantial justice can be best served if both parties are given the full opportunity to litigate their claims in a full-blown trial. (Republic of the Phils. versus Ildefonso Oleta, G.R. No. 156606, 17 Aug. 2007)


When Heavy Workload of Counsel a Justification for His Failure to File Pretrial Brief
The counsel of BPI invokes "heavy pressures of work" to explain his failure to file the Pre-Trial Brief with the RTC and to serve a copy thereof to Dando at least three days prior to the scheduled Pre-Trial Conference.36 True, in Olave v. Mistas,37 we did not find "heavy pressures of work" as sufficient justification for the failure of therein respondents’ counsel to timely move for pre-trial. However, unlike the respondents in Olave,38 the failure of BPI to file its Pre-Trial Brief with the RTC and provide Dando with a copy thereof within the prescribed period under Section 1, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, was the first and, so far, only procedural lapse committed by the bank in Civil Case No. 03-281. BPI did not manifest an evident pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe a mandatory requirement of the Rules. In fact, BPI, for the most part, exhibited diligence and reasonable dispatch in prosecuting its claim against Dando by immediately moving to set Civil Case No. 03-281 for Pre-Trial Conference after its receipt of Dando’s Answer to the Complaint; and in instantaneously filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the 10 October 2003 Order of the RTC dismissing Civil Case No. 03-281.

The Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply disregarded for these prescribed procedures insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. However, it is equally true that litigation is not merely a game of technicalities. Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an end to litigation speedily and the parties’ right to an opportunity to be heard.

This is not to say that adherence to the Rules could be dispensed with. However, exigencies and situations might occasionally demand flexibility in their application.30 In not a few instances, the Court relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merit. This is in line with the time-honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection should, thus, not serve as basis of decisions. In that way, the ends of justice would be better served. For, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of justice.31

In Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, the Court restated the reasons that may provide justification for a court to suspend a strict adherence to procedural rules, such as: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the fact that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. (Bank of the Phil. Islands versus Domingo Dando, G.R. No. 177456, 04 Sept. 2009)

Pretrial Order Controls Subsequent Proceedings
Indeed, the court and the parties must pay attention not only to the pre-trial briefs, but also to the pre-trial order. Section 7 of the same Rule states:

Sec. 7. Record of pre-trial. — The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be recorded. Upon the termination thereof, the court shall issue an order which shall recite in detail the matters taken up in the conference, the action taken thereon, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements or admissions made by the parties as to any of the matters considered. Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall explicitly define and limit the issues to be tried. The contents of the order shall control the subsequent course of action, unless modified before trial to prevent manifest injustice. (Emphasis supplied.)

Hence, the provision in the Pre-trial Order allowing petitioner to present six witnesses "shall control the subsequent course of action." The court a quo proceeded with the trial without modifying the Order. In the same vein, respondents did not challenge it before the trial. Neither did they invoke the power of the trial court to compel the petitioner to submit the names of his witnesses and summaries of their testimonies. By their silence, respondents acquiesced to the Pre-trial Order allowing the presentation of petitioner's unnamed witnesses. Modifying a pre-trial order during the trial or, worse, when the defendant is about to present witnesses will indubitably result in manifest injustice. This could not have been the intention of the Rules.

Unnamed Witnesses Barred to Testify
Pre-trial* is an essential device for the speedy disposition of disputes. Hence, parties cannot brush it aside as a mere technicality. Where the pre-trial brief does not contain the names of witnesses and the synopses of their testimonies as required by the Rules of Court, the trial court, through its pre-trial order, may bar the witnesses from testifying. However, an order allowing the presentation of unnamed witnesses may no longer be modified during the trial without the consent of the parties affected. (Silvestre Tiu versus Daniel Middleton, G.R. No. 134998, 19 July 1999)